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Pro gradu -tutkielmani käsittelee Sarah Kanen 4.48 Psychosis -näytelmää medikalisaation ja 
mielenterveysongelmien sekä feminismin ja queer-teorian näkökulmista. 4.48 Psychosis kuvaa 
mielenterveysongelmista kärsivän potilaan suhdetta itseensä sekä hoitohenkilökuntaansa ja 
hoitometodeihin, joista selkeimpinä esiin nousevat lääkitys, mielentilaa kartoittavat testaukset sekä 
psykoterapia. Tutkielma tuo esiin Kanen vähemmän tutkitun viimeisemmän näytelmän uudesta 
näkökulmasta, jossa lääketiede, tekstin rakenne ja asiasisältö sekä feministinen ja queer-teoria 
luovat pohjan analyysille, jossa korostuu sekä lääketieteellisten käytänteiden vaikutus potilaan 
minäkuvaan, että potilaan minäkuvan ja tekstin vuorovaikutus. 
 
Pro gradu -tutkielma jakautuu kolmeen osioon: ensimmäisenä käsittelen medikalisaation sekä 
psykiatrian ja anti-psykiatrin teoretisointia ja analyysia, toiseksi käsittelen psykoterapian teoreettista 
pohjaa ja kritiikkiä, ja kolmanneksi tutkin postmodernin kirjallisuusteorian avulla tekstin rakenteen 
ja sisällön suhdetta potilaan minäkuvaan.  
 
Medikalisaation, psykiatrisen ja anti-psykiatrisen sekä psykoterapeuttisen lähestymistavan pohjalta 
tutkin, kuinka lääketieteelliset hoitokeinot vaikuttavat potilaan minäkuvaan. Analysoin, saako 
potilas hänelle tarjotusta hoidosta hyötyä, ja jos ei, kuinka hoitoprosessin voidaan nähdä 
vaikuttavan häneen negatiivisesti. Lähestyn kysymystä lääkäri-potilassuhteen analyysin kautta, 
jonka lisäksi tarkastelen lääkityksen ja psykoterapiassa tehtyjen mielentilaa ja kognitiivisia kykyjä 
kartoittavien testien vaikutusta potilaan ymmärrykseen itsestään mielenterveyspalvelujen 
asiakkaana. Teoriapohjaa analyysille luovat erityisesti Thomas Szaszin, Peter Conradin ja Joseph 
W. Schneiderin tekstit. 
 
Postmodernin kirjallisuusteorian pohjalta analysoin näytelmää myös sen tekstin rakenteen ja 
sisällön kautta. Painopiste pysyy edelleen potilaan minäkuvassa ja sen rakentumisessa näytelmässä, 
joskin fokus siirtyy medikalisaatiosta ja lääketieteen vaikutuksista itseilmaisun keinoihin. Tutkin 
potilaan minäkuvan sirpaleisuutta suhteessa tekstin sirpaleisuuteen, jota tutkin paitsi tekstin 
rakenteen, myös intertekstuaalisuuden tasolla. Teoriapohjana käytän ensisijaisesti Ihab Hassanin 
postmodernia teoretisointia. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Sarah Kane was a British playwright born in Essex in 1971. She died in 1999, being only 28 years 
of age at the time. Although Kane died at such a young age, she was a productive writer: she wrote 
five plays and a ten-minute screenplay during her lifetime. She started writing in her childhood, and 
she wrote some parts of her first play, Blasted, already during her time in the University of 
Cambridge where she studied playwriting. Her plays are regarded as a part of a branch of theatre 
called in-yer-face, which is famous for its brutality, emotional honesty, and use of taboos and shock 
tactics. 
The prime time of in-yer-face theatre was in the 1990s, and its main arena was Great Britain. 
The term “in-yer-face” was coined to this usage by Alex Sierz, a journalist, theatre critic and 
scholar (2002, 5). Sierz, who has done extensive work on both in-yer-face and Sarah Kane, states 
that in-yer-face was “the dominant theatrical style of the decade” (2001, 4). In his book In-Yer-Face 
Theatre Sierz argues that in-yer-face “saved British theatre” and that in the 1990s “contemporary 
theatre was in-yer-face theatre,” explaining the importance of the genre to modern European theatre 
(2001, xii-xiii). Although this particular branch of theatre may not be that well known, perhaps 
because of its locality and radical nature, it has had a big impact on contemporary theatre. Sierz 
argues that in-yer-face playwrights have pushed modern theatre forwards by making it more 
experimental (2001, 4). In-yer-face can be seen as a theatre of extremes, since it forces its audience 
to react, not allowing any emotional detachment like traditional theatre does.  
Themes typical in in-yer-face, such as violence and brutality, are nothing new in theatre, but 
have in fact been around ever since Greek drama. However, the way in which in-yer-face portrays 
them is essentially different from past styles of theatre, because whereas in previous styles of 
theatre violence has often been performed off-stage, in-yer-face brings the “shock-fest,” as Sierz 
calls it, right in the face of the audience and pushes the limits of what has previously been 
considered as an impossibility in stage performance (2001, 36). Besides Sarah Kane, some of the 
most known playwrights in the in-yer-face tradition include names such as Mark Ravenhill 
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(Shopping and Fucking), Philip Ridley (The Pitchfork Disney), and Anthony Neilson (Normal) 
(Sierz, 2001 and 2012). 
 Sarah Kane is, as Catherine Rees describes her in the book Modern British Playwriting: The 
1990s (edited by Sierz), one of the most “famous and infamous” and controversial playwrights of 
the 1990s (2012, 112). Kane's plays have indeed caused widespread criticism, and especially her 
first play, Blasted, raised a riot in the theatre circles of Great Britain in the mid-1990s. Blasted, first 
performed in the Royal Court Theatre Upstairs in 1995, is perhaps most famous for the comment 
made by Jack Tinker, a drama critic from the Daily Mail, calling the play a “disgusting feast of 
filth” (1995). Surely, the harsh themes of the play, such as cannibalism and rape, and its 
unconventional structure did not help the digestion of Blasted amongst theatre critics. The scandal 
Blasted caused can be seen as one of the main events in the in-yer-face timeline, which lasted from 
the early 1990s to the end of the decade. Rees even suggests that Kane's life and career can be seen 
as “framing the resurgence of new British plays” of the 1990s, as the scandal raised by Blasted 
happened in 1995 and Kane herself died in 1999, about the same time as in-yer-face theatre had 
“ran out of steam” (2012, 112). Although the golden age of in-yer-face is already in the past, Kane's 
plays are still widely performed all over the world. Kane's main themes are centered around love, 
violence (both mental and physical), hope and despair. Many have criticized Kane's plays for their 
brutality and violence, often missing the similes they portray to the Western culture and history. 
Even though in-yer-face theatre is quite a British concept, Kane's Blasted, for example, is widely 
regarded to be an allegory of the Bosnian civil war. 
 Although Kane could never have been described as a traditional playwright due to the nature 
of her plays, the textual form of her plays started to fragment only towards her final plays. Her first 
plays (Blasted and Phaedra's Love), though very violent in their stage directions and content, were, 
however, traditional in form. In her first plays the characters have names, their lines are marked 
clearly, scenes can be distinguished from one another, and stage directions are present. Since 
Phaedra's Love, first the stage directions became unrealistic and brutal in Cleansed (“she is raped 
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by the voices,” “a flower bursts trough the concrete,” “rats are eating my face”). In her last two 
plays, Crave and 4.48 Psychosis, there are no stage directions, and they are much farther away from 
the naturalistic tradition than her earlier plays (Rees 2012, 58). In Crave the characters' names have 
been reduced to single letters in a Kafkaesque manner (A, B, C, and M), and in 4.48 Psychosis the 
characters have no names at all, and there are no markings to tell which character is speaking each 
time. In 4.48 Psychosis there are no stage directions and different scenes are barely distinguishable 
in the textual form by numerous hyphens. There is no evidence as to how many characters or 
speakers there are supposed to be in the play, and whether all the voices belong to different 
characters.1 Besides the abandonment from traditional forms of theatre, towards her later plays 
Kane started what Graham Saunders, the author of 'Love me or kill me': Sarah Kane and the 
Theatre of Extremes calls an “eschewal of realism in language” (2002, 88), which sets a very 
distinct mode to her plays. Kane's plays resemble each other through their themes, but the 
traditional form of theatre has quite clearly become less important towards the end of her career. 
When the form is quite free and poetic rather than theatrical, the text itself allows more 
interpretations both to the audience or the reader and theatre personnel (i.e. actors, directors etc.) 
executing the plays. The beauty in Kane's works lies in their ambiguous nature, which has become 
even more evident in her final plays. 
 In this thesis I will study Kane's last play, 4.48 Psychosis (2000). Unlike most of her 
previous works, 4.48 Psychosis received “unabashed critical success” from its first staging in The 
Royal Court Theatre in June 2000 (Claycomb 2012, 92). Besides the dramatic school of in-yer-face 
theatre, 4.48 Psychosis can also be linked to a group of “psychotherapy plays” that have emerged 
especially in the United Kingdom and Ireland in the last few decades (Watson 2008, 191). The play 
has also been discussed in relation to postdramatic theatre, although this has created some 
controversy among critics (Rees 2012, 130-132). 4.48 Psychosis is distinctly postmodern in style 
                                                          
1 Although the play can be read with different numbers of voices, the first staging of the play had three voices and 
actors: all the actors spoke as the patient and at least the male actor in the group, Daniel Evans, played parts of the 
doctor (Saunders 2002, 174). The number of the voices can change due to different productions of the play, although 
many are loyal to the staging of the original production (Claycomb 2012, 97).  
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and content with its fragmented and ambiguous nature. The play has not been widely researched, as 
the main interest of studies on Kane has been on her more traditional pieces, such as Blasted, and 
mainly on themes such as violence and cruelty that are less evident in 4.48 Psychosis than in her 
other plays. Besides, postmodern drama has not been widely researched as a whole, which has 
undoubtedly also affected the interest to carry out research on Kane in particular (Schmidt 2005, 
25). This could perhaps be because not many postmodern plays have received much success as far 
as audiences go, or maybe because one of the latest trends in drama studies seems to be focus on 
performance (Schmidt 2005, 16, 26).  
In essence, 4.48 Psychosis is a play about a patient and a doctor, who discuss and evaluate 
the mental health of the patient, sometimes together, sometimes the patient having long 
monologues, sometimes the doctor describing the patient's treatment. 4.48 Psychosis is the shortest 
and the most fragmented of Kane's plays: it has no stage directions, the scenes are barely separated 
from each other, and the characters perform in a vacuum-like space where time is not present and 
the set is only vaguely distinguishable as something resembling a hospital, a psychic ward, a 
psychiatrist's office, or perhaps a combination of these three. The characters have no names or other 
distinguishable factors, and during the majority of the play there are no clues as to which of the 
characters is speaking. Only in the dialogues between the patient and the doctor can the reader 
clearly distinguish which characters are speaking each time, as the play uses “dashes to indicate a 
new speaker” (Rees 2012, 128).  
Perhaps the most interesting thing in 4.48 Psychosis is that the reader cannot even be sure as 
to how many characters or voices there are supposed to be in the play. Sometimes the structure of 
the text (visible fragmentation and the locations of words on page) invites the interpretation of there 
being two voices for the patient that could be regarded as the “true” self and the depressed one, but 
as there is little distinction between any of the characters' voices in general, they are hard to 
distinguish. Saunders argues the play can be regarded as a set of discourses that are used as means 
to “express the boundaries between reality, fantasy and different mental states” (2002, 112). 
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Although I agree that the play certainly distinguishes between different mental states, it is still quite 
challenging to separate what Saunders refers to as “fantasy” (I would simply categorize this as an 
unreliable speaker) and “reality,” as the long passages of the patient are anything but easily 
understandable in their fragmentary and sometimes even cryptic nature. Saunders probably refers to 
the patient's more depressed moments as “fantasy” because there is no real fantasizing or elements 
of fantasy in the play, and the word itself might not be the best to describe the mind-set of a 
severely depressed person. 
 In 4.48 Psychosis, I have chosen to focus on the character of the mental patient as the 
primary object of analysis and the focus of this thesis. The basic storyline of the play consists of the 
patient's journey through different types of psychiatric and psychotherapeutic treatment and 
medication until the moment of her suicide. The patient is a nameless, ageless, featureless character; 
all we know is that she is a patient to a doctor, most likely a psychiatrist, and that she suffers from 
depression which has led to self-harm, and suicidal thoughts and actions. The patient is, in fact, a 
woman, although some critics such as Rees think that there is “no certainty about the gender of the 
protagonist” (2012, 129). However, there is clear textual evidence to the patient being female: the 
doctor's log refers to her as “she” and “her” several times (2000, 223-224), and she refers to her 
future self as “an old lady” (2000, 218). The text does not question the gender of the patient, 
although it is portrayed in quite an evasive manner, and as there is no textual evidence that would 
suggest that the patient would identify as male or any other gender, I think there is no reason to 
doubt the gender identity the patient herself has. Besides her being a mentally ill patient, there are 
absolutely no indicators giving any other factual information on her. Things such as age, class, or 
ethnicity have no role in the character of the patient, making her a universal example of someone 
with a mental illness. However, the fact that she is able to get medical treatment is evidence that she 
has, at least to some extent, a fairly privileged position in society and that she lives somewhere 
where this kind of psychiatric or psychotherapeutic treatment is available. 
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 This thesis will be divided into three main themes, the first consisting of theory, critique and 
analysis of medicalization and anti-psychiatry, the second on the theory and critique of 
psychotherapy, and the third analyzing and theorizing the divide between the fragmented mind of 
the patient and the textual form of the play. In the first two parts I will discuss the phenomena of 
medicalization and medical power in regards to the effects they have on society. I am particularly 
interested in how medical procedures and treatments together with possible diagnoses can affect the 
sense of self of the individuals subjected to them, as well as how society perceives those who 
undergo such treatment. Although 4.48 Psychosis is not about medicalization per se, I have chosen 
this point of view because mental illnesses – the topic of the play and my analysis – is one of the 
main areas that have been criticized when it comes to medicalization and the emergence of new 
diseases and disorders. Critique on medicalization and of both psychiatric and psychotherapeutic 
practices can be of help analyzing the play, as 4.48 Psychosis presents failure in these areas. 
I am interested in how the identification as “mentally ill” affects the psyche and self-image 
of the patient, and a particular interest of mine is how psychiatric practices, namely psychotherapy, 
psychiatric testing, and the use of psychoactive drugs, can be seen reflecting on the self-image or 
the physical well-being of the patient. Most importantly I want to examine whether there are any 
examples of these practices affecting the patient negatively or worsening her state. The idea behind 
this kind of analysis is to try to understand whether the patient was out of the reach of treatment, or 
whether unsuitable treatment could be at least partly blamed for her suicide at the end of the play. If 
such evidence could be found, it would prove an interesting combination with my theoretical 
sources that, at least to some extent, condemn the medicalization of most mental illnesses and are 
highly skeptical to most methods of treating mental disorders. 
 My main theoretical background will be theories on medicalization and anti-psychiatry by 
Peter Conrad, Joseph W. Schneider and Thomas Szasz, who discuss how non-normative behavior 
can be seen and made into mental disorders. I have chosen to focus on theories on how mental 
illnesses are being created and recognized in Western society, and how these disorders and 
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especially the treatment used for them affect the patient. Often the focus is merely on the diagnoses 
and on recovery, and there is not much research on how the actual treatment to a psychiatric 
disorder can affect the patient, otherwise than potentially curing them or in regards to side effects of 
the medicine. I will also examine the patient-doctor relationship, and following some of my feminist 
theoretical sources, study if the process of psychotherapy and the therapeutic encounter can be seen 
as gendered. In a treatment that affects the psyche of the patient, the relationship between the doctor 
and the patient is remarkably different than in regular doctor-patient relationships where one treats 
the body, and therefore I think it is particularly important to study how this relationship is formed 
and how it develops through the process of psychotherapy.  
In the third part of this thesis, I will examine how the fragmentation and collapse of the 
textual form compares and reflects to the self-image of the patient. The main question of analysis is 
how the fragmented psyche of the patient corresponds to the fragmentary form of both the text and 
its contents. I will analyze the textual form itself, the separation between the body and the mind of 
the patient, and the intertextual references found in the text, and analyze how these together form 
the fragmented image of the mind of the patient. Theories on the textual form, particularly on the 
fragmentation of the text and postmodernist theories are used to examine how the fragmentary form 
of the play and the mind could be considered postmodern. The works of Ihab Hassan and other 
postmodernist scholars serve as the starting point for my analysis. The “highly textual, almost 
poetic” (Rees 2012, 131) form of the play invites this kind of analysis of the form. 
 Since I have not been able to find any official recordings of 4.48 Psychosis, this thesis will 
be focused on the textual form and content of the play. However, on some occasions I will make 
notice of how the text, intended to be performed and acted out on stage, can also be analyzed as a 
play. So, I will not use any particular performances of the play as reference but rather on a 
theoretical level understand that the text being analyzed also functions as a play on stage. Unlike 
many who have studied Kane, I do not consider her comments on her plays, or her life in general, in 
regards to her plays. This is a very conscious choice, for many who read Kane's life into her plays 
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often reduce the deeper meanings of the plays. On the one hand, some see her suicide as validating 
her plays, and on the other, people see her art as mere product of depression. In too many cases her 
death has become “the lens through which to view and discuss” her plays, as Rees notes (2012, 
112). Since authorial intention cannot easily be studied after Kane's death, I think it is best to study 
the plays as autonomous textual formations meant to be performed on stage, and not to read Kane's 
personal life into them, as this could result in “too reductive a reading”, as Saunders puts it (2002, 
110). Following in the footsteps of poststructuralism and theorists such as Roland Barthes (The 
Death of the Author, 1967) and Michel Foucault (What is an Author?, 1969), I aim to avoid the 
intentional fallacy by leaving Kane's life and autobiographical facts out of the analysis in this thesis. 
 
  
9 
 
2. Medicalization and its Effects on Society 
 
In this chapter I aim to study the relationship between medicine, medicalization, medical power and 
authority, diagnoses, and how these might affect people, especially those diagnosed with diseases or 
disorders. First, I will consider medicalization from a historical perspective, giving a glimpse of 
medical history so that one can better understand the present situation. I will then examine and 
problematize the postmodern trend of medicalization, and assess some of the effects it has on 
society. In this chapter my main theoretical sources will be several different books and articles by 
Thomas Szasz, Peter Conrad and Joseph W. Schneider, who cannot be passed when medicalization 
is in question. Szasz's anti-psychiatric works undermine the whole basis of psychiatry and questions 
its intentions towards the patients, which connects to my research question of how psychiatric 
diagnoses and treatments affect the ones being treated. Szasz was among the first to criticize 
medicalization of mental disorders, and has written numerous articles and books on the subject of 
psychiatry and later on its medicalization, specifically regarding its relation to social control. Also 
Peter Conrad, sometimes along with Joseph W. Schneider, has been one of the most prolific writers 
theorizing the phenomenon of medicalization of mental diseases, however, his focus has mostly 
been on the medicalization of deviance. 
 
2.1 The History of Mental Health Care and Medicalization 
 
I shall now examine the histories of medicalization and mental illness, beginning from the 
hospitalization of mental patients and its effect on society, then proceeding to the more recent 
phenomenon of medicalization. I will go through the advancements of these two phenomena in 
order to gain basis for the analysis in the following chapters. Understanding the historical aspects 
and developments of both of these is important in understanding the present situation in mental 
health care, which serves as the background for the play being analyzed, 4.48 Psychosis. As the 
characters in the play operate in the environment of mental hospitals and in the ground of 
psychiatric and psychotherapeutic treatment, it is important to know how medicine, and psychiatry 
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in particular, have evolved to the state in which they are now in terms of diagnosing disorders and 
treating patients (by means of drugs, therapy, and hospitalization).  
I will start going through the history of mental illness and the treatment of the mentally ill 
first as the phenomenon is much older than that of medicalization. Although it is not possible to 
know whether mental illnesses have always existed or if they have come to existence either in some 
specific period of time or eventually as the human race has developed, one can still examine how 
the treatment of the mentally ill has developed through the centuries. The history of treating mental 
illness and the so called madhouse goes on as far as the fourteenth century. One of the most 
infamous – and first ever – hospitals to take care of mental patients was the Bethlehem Hospital in 
London, which from 1377 onwards was used to house mental patients (Szasz 1977, 325). At such 
an early period mental hospitals were used to incarcerate different types of deviants from madmen 
to poor people, and the number of actual mental patients was quite small. This was the case for 
many centuries. Although incarceration of mentally ill people started in the fourteenth century, 
mental hospitalization as we now understand it begun later, in the seventeenth century. By the end 
of the century mental illness had gained momentum as the “trade in lunacy” flourished (Szasz 1994, 
103, 107). In 1656 The Hôpital Général was founded in France, containing up to one percent of the 
French population (Foucault 2006, 39). The first institution in the United States open for mental 
patients was the Pennsylvania Hospital founded in 1752, and the first institution to exclusively take 
care of mental patients, Eastern State Hospital, was opened a few decades later in 1773 (White 
1920). 
Interestingly, when the last executions for witches in Europe and America were carried out 
around late 1600s and 1700s, the beginning of psychiatric institutions and hospitals started to form 
their modern ways. Thomas Szasz sees a clear parallel between the witch hunts and mental illness, 
as he claims that both concepts serve the same “social function” and the “logical and empirical 
status” (1977, 19). He argues that institutional psychiatry is comparable to the Inquisition, as they 
both have the same aim of protecting society from a deviant group. According to Szasz the only 
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difference between the Inquisition and the concept of mental illness is whom the society is being 
protected from. Szasz's main argument is that the binary setting between good and evil, healthy and 
ill, conformist and non-conformist is central to any society, and the righteous man needs a 
scapegoat, someone to other from the group or society. Szasz calls this the “perennial scapegoat 
principle,” and applies it through historical process to witches, and later on, to mental patients 
(1977, 317). The process of othering can be seen in society not only in the case of mental illness but 
in everything that is not deemed conformist, consider, for example, the treatment of sexual and 
gender minorities and ethnicities other than white. Othering is a typical trait of the Western world, 
and it is possible to find it almost anywhere in culture, for example in fairy tales, horror literature or 
films et cetera. 
Although it is clear that psychiatric care has developed since Szasz wrote his book in the 
1970s, it still offers relevant notions on medical authority and its power over individuals, the history 
of treating mentally ill people, and most importantly, critique on psychiatry as a whole. Even if it is 
not relevant to consider psychiatric care equal to the Inquisition nowadays, one should remember 
that incarceration due to mental illness still happens, though not in the same volumes as it used to. 
Reliable statistics on the matter are hard to come by, so there is no sure way of knowing how much 
psychiatric care has actually developed in relation to human rights. Nowadays it seems that one of 
the more serious problems might be that individuals seeking psychiatric help may not be able to get 
it due to long waiting processes and small budgets on treatment. Szasz's arguments regarding 
mental illness have been radical in their time, and they are still quite relevant, because the status of 
mental patients is still filled with stigma and it is definitely that of an other, although the situation is 
slowly getting better. 
Now that we have established that the treatment of the mentally ill has been paired with the 
incarceration of deviants and non-conformists throughout its history and that there was little to no 
separation between these two, we can consider how the process of establishing something as a 
mental disorder goes. According to Peter Conrad, medicalization is the process by which non-
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medical aspects of human life gain diagnostic labels and become treated as medical problems 
(1992, 209). Medicalization is a sociocultural process involved in the politics of naming, since 
medicine defines “a problem in medical terms [and uses] medical language to describe a problem, 
adopting a medical framework to understand a problem, or using a medical intervention to "treat" 
it” (Conrad 1992, 211). Medicalization constructs society so that it has the power to define almost 
any part of life as an illness. However, one must note that medicalization does not always lead to 
medicine taking care of that particular illness (e.g. the treatment of alcoholism) (Conrad 1992, 210). 
According to Conrad, medicalization can be seen to happen on at least three different levels: 
the conceptual, the institutional, and the interactional level. The conceptual level covers the medical 
vocabularies and contracts that are used to define a problem into a medical one. On the institutional 
level the process is taken into the hands of different organizations that may adopt a medical 
approach to problems in which the organization specializes in, but the treatment is not done by 
medical personnel. The interactional level comprises of physicians defining a problem as medical, 
and the results can be seen in the doctor-patient relationship, for example, the doctor does a 
diagnosis or prescribes medicine to treat an illness. (Conrad 1992, 211). Some studies, however, 
show that medicalization may be rarer on the interactional level than has been assumed (1992, 228). 
As regards to 4.48 Psychosis, my analysis will be on the interactional level of medicalization in the 
form of the doctor-patient relationship and the treatment given to the patient and the drugs 
prescribed to her. Interestingly, in the play the doctor does not give a proper diagnosis to the patient, 
but he does offer her psychiatric and psychotherapeutic treatment and several psychoactive drugs to 
treat her illness. 
Medicalization can be seen as a “broad definitional process,” in which the direct results of 
medicalization can be seen only on two of these levels, and only one of these two includes medical 
personnel (Conrad 1992, 211). It is important to notice that medical personnel are not always 
involved with the process of medicalization, but that the process is interactive, and that “organized 
lay interests” may often play an important role in the process (Conrad 1992, 219). Since the 1970s 
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many diseases that are now widely known have gained their diagnostic labels in the medical 
classification system, and have thus gained more attention and possibilities of treatment. Many 
critics of medicalization argue towards a trend of overmedicalization, since medicalization happens 
not only to actual illnesses but also to deviant types of behaviour and natural life processes, such as 
childbirth and menopause (Conrad 1992, 212-213). However, Conrad notes that medicalization is 
not an either/or situation, but there are different degrees to it (1992, 220). Although medicalization 
is bidirectional, meaning that also demedicalization occurs (e.g. the case of homosexuality), Conrad 
still argues that there is strong evidence for medicalization being on the increase in society (2004, 
158). 
The term medicalization started to emerge in theoretical writings of American social 
scientists along with the rise of a number of these new illnesses in the 1970s, as the first critics of 
the phenomenon, such as Thomas Szasz and Irving Kenneth Zola, started to regard it in relation to 
social control (Conrad 1992, 210). The first theorist to conceptualize social control to 
medicalization was Talcott Parsons, whose book The Social System was published already in 1951 
(Conrad 1992, 215). Only two decades later, Zola argues that medicalization has become a “major 
institution of social control” that could even replace law and religion as gatekeepers of the social 
norm (1972, 487). Although critics and theorists have not been able to provide clear reasons as to 
why medicalization has increased so rapidly, they have been able to point out the social factors and 
contexts that have made it possible. Conrad lists secularization of the Western world and the rising 
status of the medical profession as the two most important factors that enabled medicalization to 
take place (1992, 213). On the one hand, a cynical person viewing the situation might argue that 
new disorders and diseases are being created just so that the drug industry could sell more products 
and gain more profit, and on the other, a positive one might argue that new disorders and diseases 
are merely being found all the time because of the development of medicine, resulting in 
improvement on the conditions of people suffering from these diseases. Whichever way one thinks, 
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it is undeniable that nowadays there are far more known diseases and disorders than there were, say, 
50 years ago, before social critics started to examine the situation. 
As the concern of this thesis is on the psychiatric school of medicine, I would like to 
examine some criticism on the aspect of the medicalization of mental illnesses. What is notable is 
that some of the first critics of medicalization of psychological states were from the field of 
psychiatry themselves, such as Thomas Szasz (Conrad 1992, 210). Szasz, a psychiatrist and an avid 
critic of the concepts of mental illness and institutional psychiatry, covers the historical process of 
medicalization of mental illness in his book The Manufacture of Madness (1977). The book deals 
with the history and issues of institutional psychiatry, and how nonconformist behaviour has come 
to equal mental illness. One of Szasz’s main questions is whether or not mental illness actually 
exists, and if not, how can the treatment of mental patients be justified? Szasz lists cruelties such as 
dehumanization, oppression, persecution, and the stealing of personal dignity and political liberty as 
some of the most serious actions aimed against mental patients, either on purpose or as a side effect 
of their treatment (1977, 16-17). Because of Szasz's interest in the field of psychiatry and his 
critique towards medicalization, his theories fit the framework of this thesis very well. As I will 
study the processes of psychiatric treatment in regards to the well-being and the self-image of the 
patient, it will prove interesting to see whether any of above-mentioned (side) effects Szasz lists can 
be seen occurring in 4.48 Psychosis. 
Szasz's main argument throughout his writings is that there is no such thing as mental 
illness, only non-normative behaviour, and that medicalization in the area of psychiatry is a form of 
social control (1977, 21, 54). Although Szasz is very critical towards the existence of mental illness 
and argues that it is an entirely “fictitious entity,” he notes that this does not mean that “personal 
conduct exhibited by persons classified as mentally sick, or certain kinds of social disturbances 
attributed to them, do not exist” (1977, 20, 53). By this he means that different types of behavior 
and models of thinking typically affiliated with mental illness do exist, but that these are not enough 
reason to claim the individuals as mentally ill. Rather, Szasz regards these kind of phenomena as 
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non-conformist behavior or deviance that has been diagnosed as an illness in order to be able to 
treat and consequently conform the patients to the social norms of society. This is an important 
point to remember, as in 4.48 Psychosis there certainly are behavioral models and non-typical or 
non-conformist acts that can definitely be linked to mental illnesses such as depression (e.g. self-
harm, suicidal thoughts and actions, decreased cognitive skills, trouble sleeping etc.). Szasz does 
not to deny that these kind of actions and thoughts exist, but merely questions whether they are a 
good enough basis for the medicalization of the phenomena. In his book Cruel Compassion Szasz 
argues that psychiatry began with “the relatives of troublesome persons seeking relief from the 
suffering the (mis)behavior of their kin caused them” (1994, 103). These kind of arguments take 
away the base of psychiatry as a humane way of treating and helping the “mentally ill” and makes 
psychiatry seem more like way of families and society to get the deviants out of sight. However, 
one should remember that although many institutional practices, such as psychiatry and mental 
hospitalization, have a problematic history, they can – and often will – evolve from that, and that 
the present practices should not be judged on the basis of their history alone. 
According to Szasz the phenomenon of medicalization is not new, although it can be seen as 
a distinct trait of the postmodern era. In fact, Szasz states that “medicalization from above,” that is, 
medicalization that aims to control other people, has developed later on along with the birth of 
psychiatry (2007, xvi). He argues that “everything that people do or that happens to them” could be 
examined in the field of medicine, and therefore become medicalized (2007, xiii). The opposite of 
medicalization is the absolute faith in a higher power and a spiritual realm that overrules all that is 
material (for example, religion). Since in the postmodern era it is generally thought that people have 
rejected grand narratives and replaced them with small ones, it is understandable that 
medicalization, which could be regarded as the epitome of the fragmentation of the human 
condition, has taken place in our society (see Bennet & Royle 1999, and Lyotard 1992). Medicine 
divides the “natural” human condition into smaller and smaller pieces in the form of new disorders 
and diagnoses, it develops new techniques of examining and imaging the body, deconstructing the 
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naturalness and the wholeness of human bodies. One could consider organ donors or blood 
donations as an example of this: a body is no longer simply one's own nor is it undisturbed. Some 
also argue that medicalization has affected in a Descartesian separation between the mind and the 
body, fragmenting peoples' minds from their matter (e.g. Ramirez-Galvez 2009).  
In regards to 4.48 Psychosis and mental disorders in general one could ponder upon the 
division and differences between a healthy mind and the thought patterns, actions, and disabling 
effects that come with mental illness. A disease of the body would be easier to separate from 
oneself than one that originates in the mind or the psyche, as it can be hard to distinguish when 
thoughts are one's own, original ones or ones that have come with the illness. For example, one 
might wonder whether they are really pessimistic by nature or if that is a change that has come with 
the mental disorder. The separation between the mind and the body is also visible in 4.48 Psychosis 
in the form of the collapse of integrity between the mind and the body, further analyzed in chapter 
5.3. 
Peter Conrad argues that there are several social factors that have allowed the rise of 
medicalization, such as: “the diminution of religion; an abiding faith in science, rationality, and 
progress; an increased reliance on experts; and a general humanitarian trend in Western societies” 
(1992, 213). Already in 1972 Zola predicted that medicalization would surpass law and religion as 
the main institutions of social control, and indeed, just a few decades later Conrad and Schneider 
argue that medicine “has replaced religion as the most powerful extralegal institution of social 
control,” and Szasz agrees that “medicine has replaced theology” (1992, 241 & 1977, 19). Conrad, 
however, has also argued that medicine has not exceeded other forms of social control, though 
agreeing that it has expanded its scope (1992, 216). Indeed, one might argue both ways, but it has to 
be noted that religion, for example, still has widespread influence on people and in some cases it 
does bypass the power of medicine (think, for instance, about abortions or the general negative 
attitudes towards sexual education or contraception in some countries). 
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2.2 Medicalization and Medical Power in Society 
 
Medicine has a great deal of power in modern society, and this power is not only attached to 
medical authority, but also to financial dealings and different kinds of corporations that are related 
to the industry. In this chapter I will examine medicalization and its connection to medical power in 
society, focusing on medicalization of mental disorders and deviance. Peter Conrad and Joseph W. 
Schneider discuss the phenomenon of medical power in their book Deviance and Medicalization: 
From Badness to Sickness (1992). They claim that medicine is no longer just a branch of science 
but an industry which includes “pharmaceutical, medical technology, and health insurance 
industries” (1992, 15). There is a lot of money involved in all of these industries, and this only adds 
to the power medicine would have anyhow. As discussed in the previous chapter, the jurisdiction of 
medicine has expanded, and Conrad and Schneider state that it now encompasses many forms of 
behavior and human conditions that were not seen as medical entities some decades ago (1992, 
209).  
Since medicine has gained such prestige, it has come to control virtually all medical 
education and licensing, not to mention that it has a monopoly over anything that has been defined 
as an illness or a disorder (1992, 36). Medicine has become a part of social control, a “political 
mechanism” as Conrad and Schneider put it, by which people can dominate others (1992, 21). This 
view contrasts strongly with the meaning system associated with medical professionals in the 
Western society that regards them as beneficent. It is important to distinguish medicine as a 
discipline, that is, as the art of knowing and healing the human body and the diseases threatening its 
existence, and medicine as an industry, which has gained all aforementioned power in society and 
that deals with the issues of power and finances. In this thesis I aim to analyze and criticize both 
aspects of medicine, because though medicine as a discipline could be seen as the “innocent” part of 
the pair, it could be scrutinized because of its patriarchal history. On some levels it might be hard to 
distinguish where the line between helping people and controlling them is drawn, for example in the 
case of the medicalization of women and female bodies, which I will further discuss in chapter 2.3. 
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 Deborah Lupton has accounted three major sociological views on the power of medicine in 
Medicine as Culture (2012). These perspectives are: the functionalist, the political economist, and 
the social constructionist, and each of these regard the origin of medical power in different ways 
(2012, 105). The functionalist perspective sees power as a “generalized social resource,” and in the 
case of medicine this resource has been earned by its contribution to society. This view sees 
medicine as beneficent to society, which is how it explains the power it yields. According to the 
functionalist view, medical dominance is a “desirable method of maintaining social distance” in the 
doctor-patient relationship, as this allows the doctor to take control of the healing situation which is 
said to give emotional comfort to the patient. This results in a balanced doctor-patient relationship 
where the asymmetrical nature of power is justified. However, this is problematic since it allows no 
agency to the patient over their treatment as the doctor has all the power in the medical situation, 
and this power is seen as something that has been earned and is therefore righteous. (Lupton 2012, 
106-107).  
 The political economist perspective that draws from Marxist thought views the doctor-
patient relationship in an entirely different way the functionalist view does, as it regards the doctor-
patient relationship as characterized by “conflict of interests between the doctor and the patient”. In 
the political economist perspective power is seen as something granted by the patronage of state, 
and in the case of medicine this can be seen in the form of strict restrictions on the profession, for 
example entry to medical schools. The political economist perspective sees medical power as a 
derivative from the profession, and in the case of medicine entry to the profession is “strictly 
controlled”. According to this view, doctors are likely to “reinforce dominant capitalist ideologies,” 
for example by prescribing medication or suggesting taking up physical exercise. In essence, the 
political economist perspective regards doctors as legitimizing and reinforcing social class 
structures and the economic system. (Lupton 2012, 108-109). Lupton claims that:  
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Power relations in the western medical encounter are related to the dominance of the 
corporate and middle class in positions of influence in the medical system (as medical 
professionals, researchers, medical board members and managers) over the lower 
middle class and working class, who comprise the bulk of patients and lesser-skilled 
workers in the health-care system and who have little control over their medical 
treatment or work conditions. (2012, 109.) 
Altogether, the political economist perspective views the power of medicine and power in doctor-
patient relationships in relation to capitalist ideology, which is seen to be prevalent to medicine. 
 The third view on the power in medicine, the social constructionist perspective, is highly 
influenced by the works of Michel Foucault. The social constructionist perspective views the power 
in relation to the process of clinical examination, in which the power is perceived to be 
“everywhere” because of both the influence of the authority figure (the medical professional) and 
the individual’s “unconscious self-surveillance”. In the clinical examination the patient is both the 
object and subject of information, and the examination itself is seen as an apparatus of disciplinary 
power. The examination is typically a voluntary one, although Lupton notes that psychiatric 
institutions, for example, may use more violent means of surveillance on the body. However, in 
general the medical power is not seen only as repressive and punishing, but also as productive as it 
gives gratification for proper conduct. The social constructionist perspective views medical power 
as something necessary for the medical professionals to manage the medical encounters. This 
perspective is closely related to the critique of medicalization and the anti-psychiatrist perspectives 
I have discussed previously in this thesis, as both view medicine as means of social control which is 
one of the aspects of the social constructionist views as well. (Lupton 2012, 112-113). 
Medicalization is by no means a straightforward issue; although it has brought help to many 
a patient by decreasing the “moral and punitive consequences” of some disorders by bringing forth 
“objective and therapeutic circumstances,” it is still highly problematic (Zola 1972, 489). According 
to Conrad and Schneider, it is in the nature of medicine as an institution that it can “create its own 
demand” (1992, 15), and this raises a moral and ethical question as to whether medicine creates new 
diseases and disorders to boost its own power in society and the power of other branches related to 
it. One might question whether people are being treated for conditions that are absolutely natural, 
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but chosen to be deviant by an elite minority. Conrad argues that “what constitutes as a real medical 
problem may be largely in the eye of the beholder or in the realm of those who have the authority to 
define a problem as medical” (2007, 4). Medicine may create labels for human conditions that are 
not subject to the social and cultural norms, and in this sense, medicalization can be considered as a 
form of social control, which invades the body by means of diagnoses, medication, surgery etc. 
Zola, though arguing that medicalization has reduced some forms of punishment, adds that 
“punishments cannot be seen in merely physical terms, nor only from the perspective of the giver,” 
meaning that some forms of treatment may feel like punishment for the ill individuals (1972, 489). 
Conrad and Schneider state that medical treatments have, indeed, become a “new form of 
punishment and social control,” and that medical designations are the new social judgment (1992, 1, 
35). 
 Although medicalization is oftentimes judged by whether or not its consequences have been 
effective, one ought to remember that there is a social side to the matter that occurs, as Conrad 
notes, “regardless of medical efficacy”. The processes of medicalization essentially individualize 
and decontextualize a number of issues that would otherwise be regarded as collective social 
problems. (Conrad 1992, 223). Conrad and Schneider note some of the negative aspects of 
medicalization to be, for example, “the assumption of medical moral neutrality, […] depolitization 
of behavior, dislocation of responsibility, using powerful medical technologies, and the exclusion of 
evil” (1992, 248-252). Considering the power medicine has in our society, these accusations should 
be reviewed with particular concern. As there has been much discussion on the negative aspects of 
medicalization, one must note that its counterpart, demedicalization, has brought help to countless 
of people. Demedicalization happens when a problem loses its medical definition (Conrad 1992, 
224). One of the most important examples of this is the demedicalization of homosexuality, which 
the American Psychiatric Association removed from the DSM-II (the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders) in 1973 (Conrad 1992, 225). By noting this I am not arguing that the 
phenomenon of demedicalization would be better than that of medicalization, but merely noting that 
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there have been several medicalized issues whose medicalization has clearly been used as a form of 
social punishment, and this proves many of the points made by both Szasz and Conrad and 
Schneider. 
 As one of the main interests of this thesis is in the field of psychiatry because of the aspect 
of mental illness in 4.48 Psychosis, it is useful to consider some of the criticism psychiatry has 
encountered. Psychiatry differs drastically from other fields of medicine as the diseases it treats 
often carry severe stigmas in society. Even though the situation is slowly getting better, mental 
illnesses are still often not regarded as illnesses in the same way one would recognize for example 
cancer, heart and vascular diseases, or other such conditions that are perhaps more easily seen to be 
corporeal. Conrad and Schneider argue that medicalization may reduce this stigma by giving 
deviant, non-normative behavior an explanation as diseases, but taking note on Szasz who does not 
believe mental diseases exists, the matter becomes more complicated (1992, 247, 1977, 21). If one 
would agree with Szasz that there are no mental illnesses, labeling non-conformist behavior as a 
disease instead could not be considered as helping or aiding the people whose behavior is 
condemned by society, as the result of medicalization is in most cases some sort of treatment, which 
in this case would be unnecessary. 
 Szasz divides the psychiatric sector of medicine into two fields that differ in the way they 
view their patients. Institutional psychiatry is the field Szasz opposes to and that is the subject of his 
criticism. By institutional psychiatry he refers to the public domain of psychiatric health care, in 
which he claims psychiatrists have “full control,” as opposed to contractual psychiatry, which 
happens in the private sector and is based on a “mutual contract” between the doctor and the patient 
(1977, 23-24). Szasz claims that institutional psychiatry is “the characteristic abuse of medicine,” 
that abuses “both the human personality and the healing relationship” (1977, 25). He sees it is 
designed to “protect and uplift the group [...] by persecuting and degrading the individual” (1977, 
25). Szasz argues that institutional psychiatry is “patently fraudulent, coercive, and harmful,” but 
sees that as it has gained the support of “all classes, groups and organizations in our society” it 
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cannot easily be overthrown (1977, 92). Another substantial problem to institutional psychiatry, 
according to Zola, is the fact that it entails involuntary incarcerations and “concomitant removal of 
certain rights and privileges” (1972, 488). It will prove interesting to examine if the psychiatric and 
therapeutic encounters in 4.48 Psychosis can be put under either one of Szasz’s labels, institutional 
or contractual.  
Now that I have discussed the connections between medicalization, mental disorder, and 
medical power in society, I will move on to a topic closely related to it, that is, the idea of 
medicalization of deviance. The medicalization of deviance means the medicalization of attributes 
that are considered deviant (consider, for example, alcoholism or addictions). The medicalization of 
deviance, just as medicalization in general, is a discursive process and highly contextual. The idea 
of medicalization of deviance is relevant to this thesis since, as discussed earlier on, critics such as 
Szasz argue that there is no such thing as mental illness, in which case all medicalization of the 
phenomena attributed to them would all fall under the medicalization of deviance. Peter Conrad and 
Joseph W. Schneider argue that deviance “consists of [...] categories of condemnation and negative 
judgement which are constructed and applied successfully to some members of a social community 
by others” (1992, 5). That is, deviance is a quality that is attributed to certain individuals by others, 
often more powerful individuals from inside a society. Conrad and Schneider argue that the 
medicalization of mental illness as deviant is “the original case” of medicalized deviance (1992, 
38). 
Conrad and Schneider define deviance in five essential qualities: it is a universal 
phenomenon, though always contextual. Deviance is a social definition, and the processes of 
defining deviance and sanctioning deviant actions always involve power. Deviant actions are often 
sanctioned and the deviant individuals judged, as this is the way in which societies reinforce their 
norms and ideals (1992, 5-7). Conrad and Schneider state that although the definitions and 
designations of deviance are contextual, medicine has the legitimacy to construct and promote its 
views on deviance over any national or social boundaries. Diseases and disorders have an 
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international applicability, which means that when something that is considered deviant is 
medicalized, this will become applicable everywhere. Zola argues that psychiatry has become the 
“most dominant rehabilitative perspective in dealing with society's 'legal' deviants” (1972, 488). 
 Since psychological disorders and some actions related to them are often considered deviant 
(for example self-harm), the medicalization of deviance is very closely linked to psychiatry. 
Psychiatry as an institution is pro-medicalization by its nature, because it thrives on mental disease 
and the unwanted behavior of people. When examining the issue of medicalization of deviance 
from the perspective of mental illness, one has to make a conscious choice as to whether they 
believe mental illnesses exist, and if so, what constitutes them. Some, like Szasz, argue that mental 
diseases are not something to be medicalized at all, and his critique is of use when deconstructing 
the idea of medical power and its effects on individuals. 
The problem with the medicalization of deviance is that when medical personnel diagnose 
people, they might at the same instant convict the rest of their lives to oppression and stigma, 
especially in the case of mental illness. Because of this I have chosen to illustrate the problems of 
medicalization and especially the medicalization of deviance and mental illness to this extent. Szasz 
claims that the “language of clinical description” is but a rhetoric through which the patients are 
invalidated as “normal persons” but as mentally ill (1977, 29-30). He goes as far as arguing that 
psychiatrists can interpret “any behavior as a sign of [...] mental illness” and claims them to be 
“disciples” of ecclesiastic inquisitors (1977, 30-31). This kind of view makes medicine and 
medicalization seem like an institute of condemnation, which is surely a bit exaggerated. However, 
it is important to examine critically whether medicine labels non-conformist traits and behavior as 
mental disease. If this was the case, medicine could solely put all of the population under a medical 
label, for no one would fit the ideal or the norm. 
Although one could easily imagine medicalization to be in the hands of medical 
professionals, this does not seem to be the case in the modern day. As there has been change in the 
field of medicine, so has there been in the processes of medicalization. Conrad argues that:  
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“the engines behind increasing medicalization are shifting from the medical profession, 
interprofessional or organizational contests, and social movements and interest groups to 
biotechnology, consumers, and managed care organizations” (2005, 10). Conrad notes that 
medicalization is “increasingly an international phenomenon [as] the result of the expanding 
hegemony of Western biomedicine,” but there have been significant changes in the players of the 
field of medicine. Although medicine is the only true authority on its subject, Conrad argues that 
physicians, albeit being gatekeepers to medical treatment, are now in a more subordinate position 
regarding medicalization.  
Nowadays, the major actors in the processes of medicalization are pharmaceutical 
companies, who (at least in the Unites States) are now able to market their products, even 
prescription drugs, straight to the consumers, therefore being able to first market an illness and then 
providing a drug for it. Besides pharmaceutical companies, Conrad notes that consumers themselves 
have started to affect medicalization as a result of private medical markets. Perhaps the clearest 
example of this is the field of plastic surgery, but consumers affect the field by choosing different 
types of treatments, insurances, and hospitals for themselves or their families. It would seem that 
the market forces are gaining more ground in the field of medicine and the processes of 
medicalization, which is disconcerting because as Conrad notes, pharmaceutical companies are 
essentially corporations that hold responsibility to their shareholders, not the patients to whom their 
drugs are sold. (Conrad 2005, 3-12).    
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2.3 Feminist Criticism of Medicine 
 
According to Susan E. Bell feminists have scrutinized medicine and medical science since the 
1960s and 1970s, after the women's liberation movement and second wave feminism gained ground 
(1995, 469). It would prove more useful to talk about feminisms rather than feminism as a unified 
ideology, as there is a lot of differentiation of thought under the label ‘feminism’, but in this thesis 
the basis for feminism will be that which is generally considered as the third wave of feminism, that 
is, feminism that is influenced by postmodernism and poststructuralism and that is concerned with 
intersectionality and queer issues. The third wave of feminism began in the beginning of the 1990s 
and is considered to be the current wave by most theorists, although some argue that the era of 
internet has brought forth a fourth wave of feminism (Siegel & Baumgardner 2007, 16, Munro 
2013, 23). As some of the feminist critiques of medicine have developed during the second wave of 
feminism, one cannot afford to disregard the earlier waves of the movement though the main 
ideologies and priorities have partially changed and developed since those times.  
 Bell notes that feminists critics have studied the ways in which medicine produces diagnoses 
and treatments, especially those harmful to women (1995, 469). As the question of whether and 
how diagnoses and medical procedures may affect the patient is one of my main research questions 
in this thesis, this type of feminist stand-point to medicine is a natural choice to add to the 
theoretical background of this thesis. Feminists have thoroughly discussed and theorized gender and 
sex, and as these notions are quite noteworthy when analyzing 4.48 Psychosis, a feminist reading of 
the text will allow a more detailed analysis of these themes. Feminists have questioned medicine as 
an “agent of social control,” quite like Szasz, Conrad, and Schneider, and claimed that it “supports 
hegemonic ideologies defining gender roles,” as noted by Deborah Lupton (2012, 137-138). Lupton 
argues that medicine and patriarchy have traditionally seen feminine biological traits as the “basis 
for women's inferiority” and men as the norm for humankind, and therefore it is understandable that 
feminists have claimed a critical view to medicine and its practices (2012, 137-138). 
26 
 
 Joanna Kempner argues that biomedicine has the “cultural authority to define what is 
biological and therefore natural,” which is a feminist issue, because for many centuries the “natural” 
biology has been that of a “white, middle-class man” (2006, 633). As I have discussed earlier on in 
this thesis, medicine has the power to define what is deemed as “normal” and from a feminist stand-
point this is problematic because these definitions may often be gendered. Kempner argues that 
medicine is, indeed, one of the prime forces of gendering of bodies, as “medical knowledge reifies 
the naturalness of gender dichotomies,” such as male-female, strong-weak or big-small (2006, 635). 
Christine Adcock and Karen Newbigging have a rather intersectional view towards treating female 
patients in the context of psychiatry, and they present the idea of female patients being devalued in 
two different spheres, both “as a women, and as having a […] mental health problem” (1990, 172). 
In their view, women with mental health issues are oppressed through two different aspects of their 
life: their gender and their illness. This kind of intersectionality, and intersectionality in general, is 
very important to modern day feminist thinking because it exposes all the different ways through 
which people can be oppressed in their lives instead of just labelling people as either oppressed or 
not, thus deconstructing simple binaries. Intersectionality adds a scale to oppression, and it allows 
people to see how some people may be oppressed in different ways, and that people can have 
different amounts of oppressing factors in their lives. For example, one might be a woman, have a 
mental health problem, and be oppressed through her ethnicity, class, bodily abilities and so on. 
 Feminists have resisted medicine by arguing against one of the most profound terms used to 
categorize humans: sex. In the 1970s feminists had a breakthrough when the sex/gender distinction 
was made, labelling gender as referring to the socially and culturally formed self and sex to the 
biological self (Kempner 2006, 635). Later on feminists have argued that even the biological sex is 
a social construction, because it is based on oversimplified biological attributes such as genitalia 
and chromosomes (e.g. Butler 1990). People could have as easily picked up some other form of 
labelling each other, such as height, hair color or the size of one's foot to make up a similar category 
as sex is. Of course, sex is a binary definition based on the reproductive organs of females and 
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males that are necessary for the continuation of the human species, and is therefore not as random 
as my previous examples. Still, sex, like most categories, fails in terms of inclusion: not all human 
bodies can be strictly assessed to either the category of 'male' or 'female' (consider, for example, 
intersex and transgender individuals). Later on in this thesis the division between the body and mind 
will be further discussed, and the analysis will bring forth the question of the sex/gender divide and 
the issue of gender minorities. 
 Medical power and its patriarchal implications allow an interesting feminist stand-point to 
this thesis and particularly to the relationship between the characters, even though medicine is not 
straightforwardly patriarchal in the modern Western society. However, as Rosemary Pringle points 
out, medicine has historically been seen as a “masculine territory,” and thus it has been linked with 
patriarchal power and control, and can be examined from such a perspective (1998, 25). For 
example, in Great Britain this has mostly been because in order to practice medicine one needed to 
attend university and hold a degree, but for the longest time women were not allowed to study at 
universities (Pringle 1998, 25). Though the patriarchal history of medicine is quite evident, 
especially psychiatry can be seen as being based on patriarchal constructions, where women have 
not had a place for themselves (Adcock & Newbigging 1990, 172). One must consider the gendered 
history of psychiatry, filled with cases of disorders only women seemed to suffer from, for example 
hysteria, and the fact that women could be incarcerated in mental hospitals with just a word from 
their husbands or male relatives. Bell claims that “medical science is uncertain and ambiguous, 
infused with cultural assumptions of gender,” and it is by no means “objective and value free” 
(1995, 469-470). Adcock and Newbigging agree by discarding the idea of psychiatry as “neutral, 
value-free and thus beyond reproach” (1990, 173). 
 Although, as stated before, medicine is not a purely patriarchal entity in the modern day, it 
can still be regarded as an agent of patriarchy as it is clear that “cultural imagery of gender is 
projected into medical science,” as Bell argues (1995, 471). The language and vocabulary of 
medical science both embodies and reinforces the norms and values inherent in society, also those 
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relating to gender, which results in medical science becoming a part of “creating gender” (1995, 
492-493).  As these norms, ideas and imageries become naturalized through medical science, it is 
clear that feminist criticism – or any other valid critique – of medicine is still needed. 
 Bell uses the example of feminine cyclicity (the cycles of menstruation) to prove her point, 
which also doubles as an example of how the natural states of female bodies can be controlled by 
medicine (standardizing of the menstrual cycle through hormonal drugs) (1995, 473). Female 
bodies are far more medicalized than male ones in regards to natural aspects of life (think, for 
instance, pregnancy, menopause, menstruation and pre-menstruation syndrome, whereas male 
bodies have mostly been medicalized since the invention of Viagra and other generic drugs targeted 
for the treatment of impotence). The fact that medicalization seems to target the lives of women 
more than those of men makes it a very valid and current feminist concern. Bell uses the example of 
a hormone DES, or diethylstilbestrol, given to women as treatment during pregnancy as a warning 
example of how the “truth” in medicine can be far removed from the world of research, and how 
this has affected the lives of women and their children in rather drastic measures (1995, 492). 
 In the past decades there has been a plenty of feminist critique towards psychiatry and its 
practices (e.g. Chesler 1972, Showalter 1987). Perhaps one of the most obvious problems has been 
“the over-presentation of women as patients in the mental health system,” and thus the claim that 
women would suffer more from different mental illnesses (Coppock and Hopton 2000, 91). These 
claims are often supported by statistics, but as Coppock and Hopton note, the statistical data may 
often tell more about the institution and its practices than the actual situation (2000, 92). 
 I have chosen to include a feminist stand-point to medicine and psychiatry in this thesis 
because the nature of the play demands it. As the play has a universal female character as the 
patient treated by an equally universal, genderless doctor, the play can be seen as a dialogue 
between women and psychiatry. Besides, as the history of psychiatry has been less than benevolent 
towards women (think of incarceration by demands of relatives and the case of hysteria as 
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examples), I think it is important to study if these kinds of gendered attitudes can be still seen in the 
portrayal of psychiatric practices in literature. 
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3. Psychotherapy and Its Criticism 
 
In this part I will examine the historical aspects of psychotherapeutic practices and see how they 
have evolved into the practices that are used presently. I shall briefly describe the different methods 
and schools of psychotherapy, and go through some of the criticism that is aimed towards the 
practice. This introduction to psychotherapy and its criticism is important so one can better 
understand the analysis of the psychotherapeutic sessions between the doctor and the patient that 
will be dealt with in chapter four. I have chosen to examine psychotherapy separately from 
medicalization and psychiatry, since psychotherapy is not necessarily linked to medicine, although 
it may be performed by medical professionals. Psychotherapy originally stems from psychology, 
not psychiatry or medicine, and although it is used for the treatment of psychiatric disorders, I shall 
discuss it in its own chapter in this thesis. 
 
3.1 The Basis of Psychotherapy 
 
Since the dominant medical discourse in 4.48 Psychosis is a psychiatric one, it is important to 
examine the psychiatric methods used in the play before moving on to the textual analysis. The 
predominant mode of treatment used in the play is psychotherapy that occurs along with 
psychotropic treatment. As stated before in chapter 3, psychotherapy is not necessarily linked to 
psychiatry, but in 4.48 Psychosis it can be argued to be a psychiatric method since the person 
performing it is called a doctor, which indicates them being a medical professional. This can, 
however, be problematized as the patient does not receive any diagnosis in the play, even after 
doing numerous tests that scan her mental state. This is could be noteworthy, as psychiatrists are 
usually the ones to diagnose their patients, not therapists. Whatever the professional status of the 
character of the doctor, psychotherapy differs much from typical, bodily invasive medical practices, 
and this is why it will be discussed separately from medicine in general in this thesis.  As I am about 
to examine the doctor-patient relationship mostly based on their interaction in the patient's 
psychotherapy sessions, it is a good idea to outline some of the history and present of 
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psychotherapy and some critique surrounding the practice.  
Psychotherapy is an umbrella term for numerous different types of therapeutic branches that 
have different aspects and solutions to the patients’ treatment and possibly to the origin of their 
disorders. There are three major psychotherapeutic schools: the psychodynamic, the cognitive 
behavioural and the humanist/existential (Lawrence 2007, 73). The goal of psychotherapy is in its 
simplest sense to “alleviate human suffering and to facilitate individuals to realise their 
psychological and emotional potential” (Lawrence 2007, 72). 
 The origin of psychotherapy can be located in the hypnotism practised in the nineteenth 
century (Etchegoyen 2012, 3). The works of Jean-Martin Charcot, a neurologist who was one of the 
first to search for psychological causes for physical symptoms and the founder of the hypnotic 
treatment, inspired many famous practitioners of psychotherapy, such as Sigmund Freud (Hamlyn 
2007, 6-7). Horacio R. Etchegoyen notes that psychotherapy is an “old art and a new science,” 
stating that antecedents of psychotherapy can be found as early in history as the times of 
Hippocrates, but that the actual scientific practice we know today was founded later on in the 1900s 
(2012, 3-4).  
Sigmund Freud can be seen as the modern father of psychotherapy as a scientific treatment, 
as he introduced psychoanalysis and formed the theoretical basis and practice for this new way of 
treatment often referred to as “the talking cure” (Hamlyn 2007, 7). Since Freud psychotherapy has 
been a “treatment directed to the psyche, within the framework of an interpersonal relation, and 
with the backing of a scientific theory of personality” (Etchegoyen 2012, 5). From Charcot's 
hypnotism Freud extended psychotherapy to include “free association,” in which the patient could 
talk about whatever came to their minds (Hamlyn 2007, 8). Freud's essential concept of 
psychoanalysis was the unconscious, which one would normally have no access to except in dreams 
and slips of the tongue or pen, nowadays often referred to as Freudian slips (Minsky 1996, 3). 
Generally the thought of unconscious penetrating into the present is seen as an incident where one is 
not “themselves” because people do not consider this unconscious as part of their identities, but the 
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aim of psychoanalysis is to allow people to gain access to their unconsciousness or disassociated 
parts of their identities (Minsky 1996, 3, 11). In essence, psychotherapy is a method to treat a 
number of mental disorders or traumas through its base instrument, communication, with its 
framework being the doctor-patient relationship (Etchegoyen 2012, 5). The emphasis on 
communication as a means of recovery differentiates psychotherapy drastically from medicine. 
 Some of the most basic phenomena occurring in psychotherapy are transference and 
countertransference, which were found by Sigmund Freud and analyzed in his lecture 
“Transference” (Freud 1981, 494-495). Transference happens when the patient redirects or 
“transfers” some feelings or a relationship model from an important person in their past onto the 
therapist (Freud 1981, 494). The transferred feelings are usually originally felt in childhood, and 
most typically towards a parent. The reverse of this situation is called countertransference, and in 
this case the psychotherapist projects feelings from their past onto the patient. It is usually perceived 
that neither of these phenomena have anything to do with the actual persons of the patient nor the 
therapist, and they could be regarded as natural by-products of therapy. (Masson 1988, xx). Some 
critics, however, argue that transference is caused artificially by the therapeutic frame and setting 
and the heavy focus on the past of the patient (especially in psychodynamic therapy which is the 
modern heir of Freudian psychoanalysis) (e.g. Lawrence 2007, 88).  
Ariel Watson compares the phenomenon of transference interestingly to that of a play, 
describing it as a “tromp-l'oeil fiction of the narrated/remembered trauma”. In a sense, she regards 
transference as a sort of play acted out by the patient and the psychotherapist, and emphasizes its 
theatricality. (Watson 2008, 188). Watson points out that mental illness in general can be seen to 
have a “radical theatricality” embedded in it, explicit in all the processes of treatment (2008, 197). 
From this perspective a play about psychotherapy seems almost like a play within a play, reminding 
the reader of a Russian nesting doll, revealing yet another construct within a construct. If one would 
like to add even more layers to this, they could consider, for example, the idea of gender as a 
performance or social roles within the play (those of a patient and a doctor, a sick and a healthy 
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individual). Watson also notes the ideas of the “construction, performance, and perception of 
identity” and “the patient's performance of illness” (2008, 190). The idea of performance and play is 
particularly interesting when considering the subject of this thesis, a play about mental illness. In 
here we can first see the performance of the actors acting out the scenes of the play, and then on a 
more theoretical level the acts performed by their characters.  
 When considering psychotherapy as a treatment, it is important to understand that it is just 
that, a treatment. By this I mean that psychotherapy should not be considered as an absolute cure, as 
not all who are treated by its means benefit from it. Like any treatment that is targeted onto the 
body, also psychotherapy can fail in its attempts to aid the patient's psyche. Even the most 
promising studies on the evidence base of psychotherapy claim that around 75 percent of the 
patients significantly improved during longer periods of therapy and 50 percent in shorter periods 
(Epstein 2007, 53). There are, however, some links between the therapy and its possible outcome. 
The quality of the patient's participation is the most essential factor to the outcome of the process of 
therapy, but also the therapeutic bond between the patient and the therapist and the contributions of 
the analyst are important factors (Epstein 2007, 58).  
Asay and Lambert (1999), have proposed there to be four therapeutic factors that are “the 
principal elements accounting for client change,” and have documented percentage roles of these 
factors in determining the outcome of the therapy (quoted in Epstein 2007, 61). The therapeutic 
factors and percentage roles are as follows: “client/extratherapeutic factors (40 per cent),” 
“therapeutic relationship (30 per cent),” “technique (15 per cent),” and “hope (15 per cent”) (Asay 
& Lambert, quoted in Epstein 2007, 61). It is perhaps rather surprising how big a percentage role 
they base on the patient and their lives alone (55 per cent), and how little on the actual technique 
and expertise of the therapist (15 per cent). Surely, when addressing the most uncomfortable and 
undesirable feelings and thoughts of the patient, it takes quite a lot from the patients themselves to 
be able to open up during therapy. Lawrence agrees on the importance of the “involvement and co-
operation” of the patient but adds that any therapy is only as good as the therapist who offers it 
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(2007, 73). This becomes especially clear in 4.48 Psychosis, as further chapters and analysis on the 
character of the doctor will prove.  
 
3.2 The Criticism of Psychotherapy 
 
I will now continue to examine some of the critique towards psychotherapy. This is to better 
examine and understand what it is in the process of psychotherapy in 4.48 Psychosis that made it 
unsuccessful for the patient. Quite like the previous critique from the anti-medicalization theorists, 
Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson argues in his book Against Therapy (1988) that “a profession that 
depends for its existence on other people's misery is at a special risk [because] the very mainspring 
of psychotherapy is profit from another person's suffering” (1988, 251). This idea is quite similar to 
the critique of medicalization and medicine, claiming that soon everything could be medicalized 
and thus profited from by medicine and its beneficiaries, such as the drug market. Hence, the 
essential criticism remains the same for both medicine in general and psychotherapy: who has the 
power to categorize what is deemed as “normal” and what are the characteristics that do not fit into 
this category? However, the difference between medicine and psychotherapy lies in that 
psychotherapists do not make diagnoses unless they are also psychiatrists, and therefore they do not 
assign disorders to their patients. 
 While Masson’s work dates back some decades, the majority of his criticism is still valid. 
One of the main problems Masson sees in therapy is the therapists themselves, as he believes that 
therapists (either by accident or on purpose) will try to install their own values and structures onto 
the patients (1988, 240, 249). A particular problem Masson analyses, and which also arises in 4.48 
Psychosis, is the psychotherapists’ lack of interpretative abilities: Masson argues that therapists 
cannot apply their knowledge into the troubles of individual patients but that the patients have to fit 
into the theories the therapists are familiar with (1988, 240). Besides this, Masson has stated that 
each form of psychotherapy he has analysed (besides feminist and radical therapies) shows a lack of 
interest in physical and sexual abuse, and social injustice (1988, 240). Briefly put, psychotherapy 
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seems to be a mere extension of the dominant society and its norms (1988, 250). Masson argues that 
since psychotherapy depends on the suffering of people, the profession is corrupt by default, and he 
states that his criticism is aimed both to the profession of psychotherapy and individual 
psychotherapists (1988, 251).  
 Feminist scholars have criticized psychotherapy for many reasons. As stated before in 
chapter 3.1, Freud is regarded as the father of modern psychotherapy, and as Margaret W. Matlin 
notes, this creates an instant problem from a feminist stand-point since Freud considered women to 
be inferior to men in many aspects, the typically known phallic envy being only one of them (1987, 
397). Besides the envy and shame the lack of penises cause women, they are also more narcissistic, 
masochistic and less morally developed than men. Freud also proposed arrogant ideas about female 
sexuality, such as that vaginal orgasms were a more mature way of handling one’s sexuality than 
clitoral ones. (Matlin 1987, 397). Perhaps the most problematic feature is that Freud considered it 
necessary for the relationship between the therapist and the patient to be that of a dominant and a 
submissive, “a superior and a subordinate,” adjectives which at the time could be seen as 
synonymous to that of a man and a woman (Chesler 1997, 138). As a result of this, Matlin argues 
that therapists from the psychoanalytic branch have negative views on women that affect the 
therapy given by them (1987, 47).  
This kind of notion is close to that made by Phyllis Chesler, who has discussed the idea of 
clinical bias in her book Women and Madness (1997, 8). Clinical bias means that therapists may 
have double standards in their evaluation of mental health, favoring men who act out the 
stereotypical role of the man but disregarding women both performing in the traditional role of 
women and women who reject it, making mental illness essentially a gendered issue (1997, 103-
108). The idea of clinical bias is also intersectional, including not only sexism but also the 
judgements clinicians make based on ageism, racism and homophobia (1997, 8). As one of the only 
things the reader is allowed to know about the patient in 4.48 Psychosis is her gender, it will prove 
worthwhile to study what kind of a role she performs as a woman, and whether this might affect the 
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interpretations made of her by the character of the doctor.  
Carl Rogers offers a more therapist oriented means of successful therapy: the ability of the 
therapist to be a “real person” with the client, the ability to accept their patient as “a separate 
person,” and “real, empathetic understanding” (quoted in Masson 1988, 189). Lawrence argues that 
although a good therapist might inspire the patient to participate more, it is still up to the patient 
themselves to suffer through the process (2007, 73). Both the factors of successful therapy and the 
criticism of psychotherapy offer good ways to study the psychotherapeutic sessions in 4.48 
Psychosis and help one to analyze why the therapy did not help the patient. Etchegoyen notes that 
since psychotherapy helps people solve their “traumas, memories or conflicts” and is very personal 
in its nature, the ethics of it should not be regarded as “a simple moral aspiration but as a necessity”. 
What is interesting in regard to my following examination of the doctor, the patient, and their 
interaction is that Etchegoyen argues that the psychotherapist cannot maintain “a dissociation 
between the profession and private life” because the personality of the therapist is their main tool of 
work. (Etchegoyen 2012, 11-12). It shall prove interesting to see whether the character of the doctor 
in the play maintains to separate their private life from their profession. 
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4. Identity, Medical Power, and Psychiatric and Psychotherapeutic Practices in 4.48 Psychosis 
 
In this chapter I will focus on Kane's 4.48 Psychosis, and examine how the medical treatments 
affect the character of the patient, and analyze how she builds and shapes her self-image in the play 
both through and throughout her period of treatment. I am particularly interested in how her 
subjective experience of herself is intertwined together with the notion of being mentally ill, and in 
which ways does the illness affect her views of herself. I will also study the character of the doctor, 
and examine if and how the character and other medical professionals mentioned use medical 
authority and power over the patient, and how the doctor-patient relationship is realized in the play. 
4.48 Psychosis allows the reader a particularly interesting view to psychotherapeutic sessions, 
which would not be possible in real life because of the restrictions created by the requirements for 
confidentiality, and this allows one to examine both the doctor-patient relationship and the character 
of the doctor from a unique perspective. Besides analysis on the character of the doctor and the 
interactive elements of psychotherapy, I will also analyze if and how the negative effects of 
medicalization theorized by Szasz, Conrad, and Schneider could be seen in the play. The focus of 
this chapter will be on text analysis and close reading paired together with theories of medical 
procedure in the case of mental illness. 
 
4.1 “Doctors you’d think were fucking patients”: The Doctor-patient Relationship(s) in the Play 
 
As I mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the relationship between mental patients and their 
doctors is significantly different from that of a regular doctor-patient relationship in which the 
illness lies more straightforwardly in the body. Although mental disorders can, and often are, treated 
with different types of medication, it is still debatable whether the imbalances of the brain are a 
symptom or a cause to these disorders. Still, it should be noted that generally speaking mental 
disorders are regarded as diseases of the mind rather than the body, although this is slowly changing 
to the image of mental disorders as diseases of the brain. When treating psychological disorders, the 
relationship between the doctor and their patient is set on a rather different level as people with 
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psychological disorders are expected to open up to their doctors on their greatest failures, fears, and 
traumas, and because of this the relationship needs to be built on mutual trust and understanding. 
The chemistry between the parties also serves an important part of the success of the therapy. In 
chapter 3.1 I have presented statistics from Asay and Lambert that state that the relationship 
between the patient and their therapist accounts for 30 percent of the outcome of therapy. As the 
percentage is notable, it becomes a necessity to analyze the relationship of the doctor and the patient 
in 4.48 Psychosis if one would like to understand why the therapy did not prove successful. Also, as 
the expertise of the therapist accounts for 15 percent of the outcome, it is essential to analyze this 
factor as well and examine whether the character of the doctor has the expertise and features of a 
medical professional.  
 Deborah Lupton argues that there is a myth-like understanding of physicians as “beneficent” 
and “god-like” beings, which is culturally and historically understandable in the light of how they 
have cured people and saved lives (2012, vii). Szasz agrees with Lupton on this, stating that 
psychiatrists are seen as “loving men” (notice the gendered pronoun) “who do great good for 
committed mental patients” (1977, 91). On a contrary note, Lupton also says that physicians are 
accused of “oppressing their patients, for malpractice and for indulging in avarice” (2012, vii). One 
can conclude that the general image of doctors and physicians is quite contradictory, to say the least. 
The accusations of avarice are most likely to be related to physicians' relations with the drug 
industry, and the claims that physicians benefit from prescribing certain brands of medicine to their 
patients. The question of prescription drugs is also present in this thesis, and it will be further 
analyzed in chapter 4.2.2. The “sociocultural artefact” that is medicine is subject to many 
contradictory ideas and beliefs (Lupton 2012, ix), and in the following chapters it will be 
scrutinized from the viewpoint of the psychotherapeutic encounters between a single patient and her 
doctor in 4.48 Psychosis.  
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4.1.1 The Character of the Doctor as a Medical Professional 
 
In 4.48 Psychosis the character of the doctor is quite intriguing, not only because there is 
surprisingly no clue as to their gender, but also because there is no certainty of their actual 
profession.2 As the patient refers to them as “doctor,” it is most likely they are trained in medicine, 
and it could well be speculated that they could be a psychiatrist on the basis of the therapy sessions 
they are holding, as general practitioners do not treat their patients by means of therapy. The 
epicrisis of the patient would also indicate toward them being a psychiatrist, as psychotherapists 
would not probably have as extensive a knowledge on the medication of the patient. The only clue 
to the character being a psychotherapist is that they do not diagnose the patient even after having 
her do extensive tests to scan her state of mind.  
 Altogether there is not much for the reader to know about the character of the doctor, but 
some small details of their personal life are revealed during the patient's therapy. Considering the 
basis of therapy (i.e. a patient discussing their problems), it is rather curious that we learn anything 
at all about the doctor in these sessions, as those should be only about the patient, her disorders, and 
her issues. Although we do learn about the social and private life of the patient, too, it is sometimes 
hard to distinguish whether this information is factual or not because of the obscure and sometimes 
cryptic language of the patient, and the fact that we cannot be sure whether her speech is 
metaphorical. The reader is faced with the unreliable voice from the patient, mainly because of the 
fact that the patient is mentally ill, which could possibly affect her reliability in the sense that her 
sense of reality might be altered, as cognitive problems are indeed typical in disorders such as 
depression. The discussions between the doctor and the patient carry on almost through the entire 
play apart from the last few pages in which only the patient is speaking. There is only one part in 
which only the discourse of the doctor can be heard, and this is the epicrisis of the patient, or at least 
                                                          
2 In this thesis, singular they is used when referring to the character of the doctor. As the choice of pronoun in this case 
would be highly political, I consider it best to use a gender neutral pronoun for the character. Singular they has been in 
use for centuries in the English language when the antecedent is indefinite, which is why I prefer it to the recently 
formulated pronouns for gender neutral use (see, for example, Zuber and Reed 1993). As the gender of the doctor is, in 
fact, indefinite, singular they fits the occasion. 
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a part of it, although some critics do argue that even here the reader witnesses the patient reading 
her own epicrisis because of the rude language and obvious irony present in the scene (2000, 223-
225). 
 Though there is no indication as to the gender of the doctor, one can see the medical power 
they use as traditionally and stereotypically masculine, as medicine has a strong patriarchal history 
and also present, at least to some extent. Therefore, it is not particularly important to know the 
gender of the doctor, as the theories and practices psychiatry and psychology use are derived from 
mostly male theorists and practitioners of medicine.3 Indeed, as Maye Taylor argues: “since the 
most current theory and practice is imprisoned with this patriarchal ideology, it is logically 
inevitable that psychotherapy partakes of that ideology, and therefore that it is permeated by 
sexism” (1990, 105). Phyllis Chesler also notes that the gender of the clinician does not matter as 
the institution of therapy is a patriarchal one (1997, 139).  
It is interesting to consider that in most stagings of the play the doctor has been portrayed by 
a male actor, though there is no textual evidence to support that kind of a reading. Perhaps the 
casting directors have wanted to convey the image of patriarchal medicine, or maybe they have just 
read the character to be male because of this association between medicine and patriarchy. One 
could argue that the profession of medicine is culturally seen as so inherently masculine that there 
would not be even a question as to whether the character should be portrayed as male or not. Taylor 
states that psychiatry has been one of the components of the “subordination and oppression of 
women” and that women have “historically acquired the role of the patient” whereas “men have 
largely taken on the position of doctor” (1990, 104). Taylor also argues that this has led to an 
assumption of women as “mentally unstable” and men as “mentally healthy,” and thus better suited 
to practice medicine (1990, 104). Maybe these kinds of reasons could explain or justify why both 
doctors in general and the character of the doctor in 4.48 Psychosis are almost always understood to 
be male. This could also be linked with Szasz’s lists of negative side-effects of psychiatric care, 
                                                          
3 Consider, for example, some of the most famous theorists among the field: Sigmund Freud, Erik Erikson, Carl Jung et 
cetera. 
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since seeing the profession as so inherently masculine could be seen as a form of oppression. 
 I will now proceed to examining the character of the doctor as a medical professional in the 
play. The character of the doctor can be seen as problematic because it seems that rather than trying 
to help the patient, it seems the doctor is judging, patronizing and condemning her in numerous 
different ways, actions which could be read not only as harmful but also as patriarchal and 
oppressive. The most help they seem to offer is suggesting the use of psychofarmaceutical 
treatment, which the patient reluctantly accepts.  
From the very first page of the play the interaction between the doctor and the patient is set 
on a slightly unsympathetic tone. The doctor seems to almost interrogate the patient numerous times 
throughout the play, starting from the first page, where they repeatedly question the patient on 
“what do you offer your friends to make them so supportive” (2000, 205, also repeated on pages 
236-237). The idea that a mentally ill person would need to offer something to gain the support of 
their friends is quite unusual, and it makes relationships between people seem almost like a market 
in which there must always be a balance of giving and receiving. Surely, I do not claim that at least 
some of the basis of human relationships would not be based on this kind of a balance, but ill 
people should not be expected to offer anything in return for the support they are given. Although 
the question of the doctor seems quite cynical, it must be noted that this kind of a question could be 
seen as an attempt to try to get the patient to see the good qualities in herself that would make her 
friends want to support her in her time of need. This kind of action could perhaps motivate the 
patient to see herself in a different, more positive light, and also help her remember that she does 
have friends who are willing to help and support her.  
Most of the interrogations of the doctor are not this ambiguous in their nature, but 
straightforwardly insensitive. Here, the word interrogation is used to underline how the doctor does 
not even try to reformulate their questions in order to help the patient answer, but blatantly repeats 
them to the patient until she is willing – or compelled – to answer. Considering the cognitive state 
of the patient as someone who suffers from depression, the doctor should understand that forming 
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coherent sentences analyzing her own state and thoughts can be difficult, and thus it might help that 
the doctor would assist the patient by reformulating their questions, asking different questions 
altogether, or just noting that the patient seems to have a hard time answering or finding the right 
words.  
The character of the doctor continues their one-sided questioning of the patient by using the 
same questions several times in a row again in the next dialogue between them and the patient. The 
doctor first notes, “You are not eighty years old,” followed by the question “are you?” repeated 
twice, following with “or are you?” (2000, 211-212). Although the last questions could seem to 
allow the possibility of the patient’s original statement, her being eighty years old, it does not seem 
sincere in the context. In the following dialogue between them the doctor continues their 
questioning. Again the form of the question does change slightly, such as “did it relieve the tension” 
to “did it give you relief” (2000, 216). Although the form of the questions changes slightly in both 
examples, the doctor still uses the identical forms of the questions at least two to three times. This 
could be seen as a failure to understand the patient and see things from her perspective, because 
though the patient is either silent or denies the interpretations the doctor has expressed of her state, 
they continue asking the same questions over and over again, as if they were hunting for a specific 
answer that they could agree on and analyze in relation to their education. It becomes clear that the 
doctor does not allow any other interpretation of the patient's actions but their own, as after the 
patient has denied cutting herself giving her relief or relieving the tension and gives an explanation 
of her own, the doctor still states “Lots of people do it. It relieves the tension” (2000, 217), which 
erases the agency of the patient as an expert of her own feelings. 
 It would seem the doctor is so embedded in their education and conceptions of how mental 
disorders function and how mentally ill people act that they are not able to change their views even 
in the face of a contradictory case. Perhaps their education on the medical theories of mental 
disorders do not allow them to view these types of cases as “exceptions to the rule,” or maybe they 
just refuse to make changes to their own views altogether. Even the patient comments to the doctor's 
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questioning on her cutting with “I don't know where you read that, but it does not relieve the 
tension,” pointing out the doctor's academic but not necessarily practical knowledge of mental 
illness (2000, 217). Ariel Watson argues that 4.48 Psychosis discusses particularly the failure of 
psychiatry, and specifies that the particular failure in the play is that the doctor cannot see the 
patient as an individual but as a mere diagnosis that should conform to the typical patterns of the 
illness in question (2008, 189). Masson, whose theories I discussed in chapter 3.2, has also argued 
that the main problem in psychotherapy are the therapists themselves, mainly because he sees that 
they will try to impose their own structures and the structures of dominant society onto their 
patients, which is quite precisely what is happening in 4.48 Psychosis. In chapter 3.1 I examined 
theories on psychotherapy by Lawrence, and according to her the goal of psychotherapy is to 
alleviate human suffering. It is clear that this goal was not reached either in the dialogues analyzed 
in this chapter or in 4.48 Psychosis as a whole, as the patient seems to be suffering throughout the 
entire play. 
 Besides relentlessly questioning the patient, the quality of the therapy given by the doctor is 
quite questionable. They often patronize the patient and belittle her ideas and threats, not taking her 
seriously as a fellow adult. For example, the doctor comments on the patient cutting herself: “that's 
a very immature, attention seeking thing to do” and later on when she discusses her plans on 
committing suicide the doctor simply states that “it wouldn't work” (2000, 216, 210). The first 
quotation shows well the judgemental tone the doctor has towards the patient, added with 
downplaying her as “immature” and “attention seeking,” adjectives fit for a child or a rebellious 
teenager. Even if the actions of the patient could be described as such, it is doubtful whether hearing 
these kind of words from her doctor would aid her situation. In essence, the character of the doctor 
is reducing the actions of the patient to those of someone who is clearly not equal to them in 
maturity. Watson argues that “the anxiety of the patient is a result of a sense of being judged or 
assessed” (2008, 190), and here I think the actions of the doctor only add to this. Cutting and self-
harm are serious matters, and a doctor specialized in psychiatric issues should be able to handle 
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these kind of actions and situations better than by making the patient feel even worse about 
themselves by blaming them for their actions and by attributing the symptoms of depression to their 
personalities.  
 The second quotation about her suicidal plans shows how the doctor's attitude towards the 
patient as an adult capable of committing acts such as suicide as completely absent. It is obvious 
that a doctor should not encourage their patients to these kind of acts, but it is still notable that the 
only reaction to the patient's plan is a simple note that she would not be able to manage to commit 
suicide properly, although the patient has quite an extensive plan on how to commit the act (“take 
an overdose, slash my wrists then hang myself,” 2000, 210). One would assume such a statement of 
hopelessness and severe depression from a patient might be met with fear for the patient's life, 
sympathy and understanding, and perhaps a plan on how to prevent the act from happening. In his 
book The Suicidal Mind Edwin S. Shneidman claims that about 90 percent of people who have 
committed suicide have been found to give verbal clues on their actions in a retrospective study, so 
any talk about suicidal tendencies should be taken very seriously (1996, 56). Prospectively 
speaking, only two to three percent of people talking about committing suicide will actually do so, 
but still one ought to be careful with a patient with such precise, infallible plan to kill herself.  
In the end of the play, after one failed attempt, the patient does manage to commit suicide 
exactly the way she originally planned it, and so the indifferent response of the doctor could even be 
taken as neglecting the patient when she had clearly verbally stated her plans to kill herself. In the 
case of the patient the intention to kill oneself was evident and even the method thought out, and 
one might only wonder if hers was a case that could have been prevented by proper care and 
preventive measures. The reader cannot be sure whether the patient is already hospitalized when she 
is discussing her plans, so it is impossible to know whether (involuntary) incarceration could have 
prevented her suicide. 
 In this chapter I have examined how the doctor reacts to the patient's statements during their 
therapeutic session, but I have yet to analyze what the reader learns about the doctor in the play 
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besides the dismissive attitude towards the patient. I think it is important to study which facts of 
themselves the doctor allows the patient to know and which they decide to keep for themselves, not 
only because the doctor is not really supposed to tell anything about themselves and concentrate 
only on the patient, but also because it might help the reader to understand why they are acting as 
they are.  
The reader does not learn anything about the personal life of the doctor until after halfway 
through the play, and even the patient states “I know nothing of you” (2000, 236). Until this point 
the doctor has tried to keep up the appearance expected from a medical professional, but in the last 
fourth of the play it seems they have a slight mental collapse of their own. There is a harsh 
confession from the doctor, stating that they “fucking hate this job” and that they need their “friends 
to be sane” and “really together” (2000, 237). From the same page we also learn that the doctor has 
a lover, something that is known about the patient, too, but with her this information cannot be fully 
confirmed. The doctor does apologize for their behaviour, saying they were trying to “explain...” 
and the reader can connect this to the fact that on the previous page they were trying to explain the 
state of their relationship with the patient and that it is only professional (2000, 238). The personal, 
confessional mode of the doctor allows the reader to understand that they are not acting fully 
professional with the patient, and with this knowledge paired with the previous analysis on their 
behaviour during therapy the reader can start to question other aspects of the therapy they are 
providing as well. 
 Although the doctor tries to convince the patient – and perhaps themselves too – that their 
relationship is purely professional, some of the doctor's reactions towards the patient's distress 
almost invite the reader to believe the doctor cares for the patient in a way that is more than just 
professional. For example, the doctor tells the patient there is nothing to worry about because “I'm 
here” and tells her “I like you [and] I'll miss you” (2000, 228, 237). These exemplify how the doctor 
crosses the line between the “professional relationship” they think they have with the patient (2000, 
237). The doctor's opinion of their patient should not matter, only the fact that they are getting better 
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because of the treatment given to them. These kind of statements from the doctor seem a bit 
suspicious, especially if one were to read the character as a representation of the male aspects of 
medicine. Patients should be able to heal in therapy, not wonder about what their doctors might 
think about them. One might wonder what is the doctor’s objective to say such personal things: 
perhaps they are infatuated with the patient, perhaps simply ignoring the guidelines of professional 
behavior, or maybe trying to convince the patient that she is well-liked because they themselves like 
her and therefore she should feel better about herself. Whatever their objective, the behaviour of the 
doctor is undoubtedly affecting the patient in a manner preventive of her recovery. It is hard to see 
the character of the doctor as a “supposedly morally neutral and objective expert” as Zola claims 
doctors are generally seen, because it seems their personal life is tangled with their professional one 
(1972, 487). 
 We can conclude that the doctor's attitude towards the patient is quite questionable, and so is 
their relationship to her, and the way they handle themselves as a medical professional. On the other 
hand they seem to clearly want to distance themselves from the patient as a medical professional 
doing their job, but on the other they seem to use their fondness of the patient as a sort of reason for 
their knowledge that the patient will eventually get better. To get back on Szasz’s list of the negative 
side-effects of psychiatry, it would be possible to apply at least stealing of personal dignity to the 
actions of the doctor, since they actively belittle the patient and sometimes seem to forget that she is 
suffering from a severe mental illness and treating her as if her cognitive abilities were fully intact. 
This in itself is rather contradictory: on the other hand they are claiming the patient to be immature, 
on the other they are expecting full cognitive abilities and mature actions from her. This could make 
the patient feel even worse about themselves, maybe even that she would not be smart enough to 
answer the doctor’s questions, and this could be seen as an oppressive action, as it makes the patient 
feel inferior.  
Considering Conrad and Schneider’s critique on medicine (discussed in chapter 2.2) and 
Masson’s critique on psychotherapy (discussed in chapter 3.2) that claim that both medicine and 
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especially psychotherapy are dependent on the suffering of people in order to gain profit, one might 
wonder if this kind of thinking could be applied to individual doctors or therapists. If a patient 
would not recover from their illness, it would mean a longer therapeutic relationship, and therefore 
more work for the doctor or therapist in question. This seems like a rather bleak scheme, but in 
essence it is the main argument of Masson’s criticism. Regarding Szasz’s distinction between 
institutional and contractual psychiatry (presented in chapter 2.2), it would be hard to see the 
therapy given by the doctor as anything other than institutional. It seems the doctor is quite 
contradictory, sometimes even confrontational in their actions, and understandably this affects not 
only the doctor-patient relationship and the patient’s recovery process, but also the way the patient 
sees her doctor, which is what I shall examine in the next chapter. 
 
4.1.2 The Patient’s Attitudes towards Her Doctor(s) 
 
I have now examined and analyzed the actions of the doctor towards the patient in their therapeutic 
relationship and their actions as a medical professional, and will now proceed to study how the 
patient feels about her current and previous doctors. Although the play concentrates on the current 
therapeutic relationship between the patient and the doctor, the patient does mention some of her 
previous doctors, too. These previous doctors are not characters in the play, merely mentioned in the 
discourse of the patient. One might want to argue that the patient’s opinions of her doctor would be 
of vital importance to the success of therapy as the Asay and Lambert statistics I presented before in 
chapter 3.1 gave such importance to the life and attitudes of the patient in regards to the outcome of 
therapy. As the client themselves and/or extratherapeutic factors can account for up to 40 percent of 
the outcome of therapy and the doctor patient relationship up to 30 percent, it is evident that these 
themes need to be analyzed in regards of the play. As the patient’s attitudes towards their doctor can 
result from other factors than the actual relationship between them, such as their previous 
experiences with other doctors, one needs to consider both the extratherapeutic and therapeutic 
factors. 
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 On many occasions the patient's attitude towards her current doctor seems overly 
affectionate and the patient seems to be quite invested in their ability to cure or save her. This is 
shown in many of the patient’s statements, such as: “I trusted you. I loved you,” “I beg you to save 
me from this madness that eats me,” “I came to you hoping to be healed,” “you are my doctor, my 
saviour, my omnipotent judge, my god, the surgeon of my soul” and “you are my last hope” (2000, 
209-210, 226, 233, 236). It is evident that the patient has high expectations of her doctor, which 
could be explained by the patient's experience that her current doctor is the first that has truly cared 
about her well-being. This is shown in statements such as the following: “the only doctor who ever 
touched me voluntarily, who looked me in the eye, who laughed at my gallows humour […] who 
took the piss when I shaved my head” (2000, 209).  
A significant factor when considering the citations of the patient is that she seems to have an 
understanding of her healing or recovery as something the doctor would do or perform on her rather 
than herself taking an active part in it as one does in therapy. This is quite an essential clue if one is 
to examine why the patient does not seem to benefit from her therapy. Overall, it should be noted 
that the patient’s feelings on the care and treatment of the doctor may not be on a fully – or at all – 
professional level, but I will examine that issue further later on in this chapter. However, it is 
evident that the patient considers her current doctor to be somehow different than her previous ones, 
as she states “I was believing that you were different” (2000, 210). It seems as the doctor was the 
first one to actually take interest in her or seem like a trustworthy medical professional, as her 
previous doctors are described as: 
Inscrutable doctors, sensible doctors, way-out doctors, doctors you'd think were fucking 
patients if you weren't shown proof otherwise, ask the same questions, put words in my 
mouth, offer chemical cures for congenital anguish and cover each other's arses. (2000, 
209) 
 
The citation is interesting, because as analyzed in the previous chapter 4.1.1, also her current doctor 
seems to be asking the same questions repeatedly and their involuntariness to accept the patient’s 
answers could be seen as “putting words” into her mouth. The patient also receives medication 
during her treatment with the current doctor. The patient also comments on her previous doctors: “A 
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room full of expressionless faces staring blankly at my pain, so devoid of meaning there must be 
evil intent” (2000, 209). This memory of doctors being so clinical and coldly professional that the 
patient is no longer sure if they are there to help her helps the reader to understand why the patient 
seems so fond of her current doctor, one that shows emotion towards her, as examined in the 
previous chapter.  
 Although it would seem the patient is content with her current doctor, she does indicate very 
early on in the play that she does realize that all doctors are in essence the same, and that her current 
one is only slightly better than her previous doctors. It might be that she feels this way because she 
has formed an emotional bond to them. After stating her love for the doctor (“I loved you”), she 
makes it known she knows the doctor is lying to her (“who lied and said it was nice to see me”) and 
continues on a cruelly realistic note: “it's not losing you that hurts me, it's your bare-faced fucking 
falsehoods that masquerade as medical notes” (2000, 209, 210). Also, quite alarmingly she states: 
“You know, I really feel like I’m being manipulated” (2000, 215), which could be read as the patient 
actually criticizing the doctor’s abilities as a therapist and their professionalism as well.  
The patient does indeed seem to have quite a contradictory view on her current doctor, and 
the feelings she expresses could be seen as evidence of a love-hate relationship. On the one hand the 
patient seems infatuated or even in love with her doctor, on the other she seems to detest them. The 
patient's feelings are, however, quite understandable given the doctor's own actions that reflect the 
same sort of attitude towards both their patient and their profession, mentioned in the previous 
chapter. Mixed feelings aside, it would appear the patient is hopeful for her treatment with her 
current doctor, who she seems to hold in an almost god-like position with a unique ability to cure 
her (compare with Lupton's commentary on the image of physicians in chapter 4.1), but then again 
she does realize the doctor has no personal interest in her and that for them she is just another 
patient to be treated. Still, the patient states: “of course I love you” and “I've always loved you, even 
when I hated you” (2000, 240). 
 There are a few parts in the play in which the reader cannot be sure whether the patient is 
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talking about the doctor or someone else, but I am inclined to think she is talking about her current 
doctor in at least some of the cases. This is because the patient is clearly addressing someone 
(“you”) when she speaks, and because the layout of the page gives the impression of a single-sided 
discussion (first the patients speaks, then a “silence” takes place, and this turn-taking continues 
throughout these pages) (2000, 214-215). The reader can understand the silence as the doctor's part 
or response in the conversation because there are other parts in the play where his turns in 
conversation are marked in a similar manner (e.g. 2000, 211, 217), and there are also cases where 
the same “silences” equal as the patient's parts in a conversation (e.g. 2000, 205, 212). From the 
examples it can be noted that the silence is not only a pause in a monologue, but a pause that is 
appointed to a certain person, in this case, the doctor. When these passages are understood as being 
addressed to the doctor, the reader is allowed an even deeper understanding of the contradictory and 
almost disturbing nature that lies in the patient's view of her doctor.  
Indeed, when explaining how she feels about her current doctor, the patient seems to be in 
agony: 
Sometimes I turn around and catch the smell of you and I cannot go on I cannot fucking 
go on without expressing this terrible so fucking awful physical aching fucking longing 
I have for you. And I cannot believe I can feel this for you and you feel nothing. (2000, 
214) 
 
I think these lines alone could express what is essentially wrong with the patient's image of her 
doctor. It is obvious that the patient does not regard the doctor as a mere physician but she has 
formed some kind of an emotional bond for them, although a single-sided one. As the actor Daniel 
Evans has noted in his interview with Graham Saunders, it seems there is an “incredible craving to 
find the beloved” and that the “unbearable” for the patient is that her love is not reciprocated (2002, 
173). As the patient has no one for whom she could express her love, it would seem as if she is 
overflowing with the emotion, but not in a positive sense but rather in the sense of almost drowning 
in the excess of it (“I cannot go on without expressing this terrible so fucking awful psychical 
longing I have for you” 2000, 214). On the one hand the reader gets the feeling that for the patient 
the presence of the doctor would be essential for her well-being, but on the other hand there are 
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quite a few points in the play where she seems to despise them. For example, she refers to her 
doctor (and everyone else, for that matter) as a “stupid mortal cunt,” which is hardly an expression 
of love (2000, 210). Another extreme example is presented when during a therapeutic session the 
patient threatens the doctor as she is anguished by the anger and pain of how awful a person she is: 
“I’ll suck your fucking eyes out send them to your mother in a box and when I die I’m going to be 
reincarnated as your child only fifty times worse and as mad as all fuck I’m going to make your life 
a living fucking hell” (2000, 227). The citations analyzed here allow the reader to further 
understand the idea of how extremely the patient’s emotions of love and hate for her doctor truly 
alter, and also how disturbing the doctor-patient relationships seems from the patient’s perspective. 
 Since parts of the play, particularly those in which the doctor and the patient are interacting, 
can be recognized as psychotherapeutic sessions, it is important to consider one of the most typical 
phenomenon that occurs in the doctor-patient relationship during psychotherapy. As I have 
mentioned before in this chapter, the patient seems to have a rather contradictory attitude towards 
her doctor, stretching from feelings of love and longing to contempt and hate. As I have explained 
before in 3.1, transference is a typical occurrence in psychotherapy, and the reader might wonder if 
the extreme reactions of the patient could stem from this phenomenon. The act of transference 
might explain some of the emotions the patient has for the character of the doctor, but the reader 
cannot be sure of this as no previous relationships of the patient are discussed in the play, apart from 
three mentions of a lover (“my lover is dying,” “I shall hang myself to the sound of my lover’s 
breathing,” “I am jealous of my sleeping lover,” 2000, 207, 208). However, the feelings the patient 
directs towards the doctor seem to fit into Freud’s descriptions of transference. Freud states: 
“transference can appear as a passionate demand for love or in more moderate forms; in place of a 
wish to be loved” (1981, 494). Indeed, the patient states “the vital need for which I would die” 
several times, each time addressing love as this most essential of all her needs (2000, 219, 242). 
Freud also notes that: “the hostile feelings as a rule make their appearance later than the affectionate 
ones and behind them: their simultaneous presence gives a good picture of the emotional 
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ambivalence,” and adds that “the hostile feelings are as much of an indication of an emotional tie as 
the affectionate ones”. Freud states that transference is not something to be worried about unless it 
becomes a hindrance to the process of psychotherapy. (1981, 494-495). In the case of 4.48 
Psychosis the reader might wonder whether the transference of the patient has become an obstacle 
for the process of therapy, and if this might be why the patient does not seem to benefit from her 
treatment. However, with no indication of past relationships of the patient, this could merely be 
recognized as an educated guess. 
Although it seems the emotions and feelings of the patient are directed towards the doctor as 
a whole, a single persona the patient has created of them in her mind, it is interesting that the patient 
is aware of the contradiction between her doctor as a medical professional and as a private person. 
When the patient states “fuck you God for making me love a person who does not exist,” this 
becomes evident to the reader (2000, 215). As the patient realizes she has fallen in love with the 
image she has of the doctor rather than an actual person, she suddenly realizes her love is without 
foundation. However, as the doctor themselves has given the patient numerous clues that they might 
be interested in her more than professionally, it is understandable that the patient might have felt 
confusion between the professional and the private, the doctor and the actual person. 
 Now that I have examined the patient's views on her doctors, I will proceed to analyze the 
patient's attitudes towards her treatment as performed by both her previous doctors and her current 
one. In this part I will only consider her treatment in an interactive context, as I will examine the 
more impersonal and generic methods of treatment in the following chapters. Earlier I explained 
how the silences in dialogues can be addressed both as the doctor's and the patient's responses or 
turns in conversation, but I think these silences also hold an important meaning as the patient's 
responses to her treatment. As the main element of psychotherapy is discussion, silence could be 
regarded as resistance to the treatment. It could also be read as the patient not finding the right 
words to discuss her state, but seeing the silences as a form of opposition would fit the context 
better, as most of the play is filled with just the patient talking and it seems that not being able to 
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speak is not a particular concern for her, even if her utterances made no sense. One could argue that 
the patient would not be silenced by her doctor until she would specifically want to remain silent, as 
she seems quite self-reflexive about her life and her mental state throughout the play. Watson argues 
that the silences could be regarded as “a means of resisting the theatricality of the therapeutic 
encounter” (2008, 194). She elaborates: 
It is a refusal to act within the script of expectation and diagnosis, an assertion of the 
individuality of each case, each patient, each subjectivity. As such, it is accompanied by 
the refusal to show wounds (psychic and real), to act for the spectators – the medical 
profession and society. (2008, 194) 
 
Watson adds that “the patient persona's unresponsiveness also mirrors and co-opts the conventional 
use of silence by therapists, putting the pressure of speech and elaboration on the observer” (2008, 
195).  
Indeed, when the patient remains silent the persona of the therapist becomes exposed as they 
have to continue the conversation in order to be able to continue the therapeutic session. Under this 
pressure of speech the mindset of the therapist becomes evident as they have to go on elaborating 
and explaining what they meant so that the patient would understand and eventually react to their 
speech (same, of course, happens the other way round in typical therapeutic sessions). Watson notes 
that the silences in the therapeutic environment can be regarded as a power play of sorts, and argues 
it is precisely this “power play of silence” that characterizes the therapeutic encounters between the 
patient and the doctor (2008, 207). The idea of the therapeutic encounter as having a power play is 
rather interesting, as in this thesis some of the emphasis has been on the power granted by the 
medical profession, but in this case both the patient and the doctor are presented with equal 
opportunities to control the situation. Especially interesting is that in this case the power seems to 
emerge from ostensible passivity, the act of remaining silent. However, one might still argue that the 
patient has no true power in the situation as she needs to be treated and preferably cured of her 
condition. As the patient states: “no way to reach out / beyond the reaching out I’ve already done,” 
the desperation of her situation becomes obvious (2000, 238). Essentially, the patient states that the 
psychiatric treatment she is currently invested in is her proverbial last straw, the last possible 
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method to be healed. 
 What one needs to remember when analyzing the play is that the behavior of the patient is 
affected by her mental illness, and because of this we cannot blame her for her actions and attitudes 
as we cannot know to what extent it is of her own nature and to which her illness. Considering the 
patient as a mentally unstable person reminds the reader of the responsibilities of the doctor, which 
in the play they have seemed to forgot, at least partially. Giving the patient mixed signals of their 
emotions towards her and allowing her to form an emotional bond to them beyond what is 
considered a healthy and professional doctor-patient relationship is quite questionable. It is 
understandable the patient would turn to her doctor in her time of need, but it is the doctor who 
should be able to draw the line to their relationship. As no clear line is drawn, it has resulted in the 
confusion of the patient, and perhaps even in the worsening of her state. 
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4.2 Psychiatric and Psychotherapeutic Methods 
 
In the previous chapter I have analyzed the relationship between the doctor and the patient and the 
interactive aspects of her treatment, and will now proceed to examine and analyze the more generic, 
impersonal aspects of the treatment, namely psychiatric medicine and different types of tests used 
for scanning mental disorders. In 4.48 Psychosis the patient receives different types of medication 
and she does different sorts of tests that help evaluate her mental state, and in this chapter I will 
examine how these are significant to both the patient’s well-being and her image of herself as a 
mentally ill individual. As the doctor does not diagnose the patient during the play, these tests help 
the reader understand what sort of mental states the patient has in different parts of the play and 
what kind of a disorder she is suffering from.  
Both the psychiatric test and the medicine prescribed for the patient can be seen as results of 
the medicalization of mental disorders, as without the process of medicalization there would be no 
need for such diagnostic measures as the tests or such options for treatment that the drugs represent. 
Since both the tests and drugs can be seen as results of the medicalization of mental illness, it is 
particularly important to study how these affect the patient as it provides information on how 
medicalization can affect people on an individual level. One must notice that the representations of 
psychiatric methods of treatment and their effects on the character of the patient exemplified in 4.48 
Psychosis are fictional, and therefore the results of the analysis found in the following chapters 
cannot be generalized in a universal manner, but they can be treated as examples of how 
medicalization and medical power could affect individuals and how these effects are represented in 
drama and literature. 
 
4.2.1 Psychiatric Testing 
 
In psychiatry and psychotherapy, there are several types of tests medical personnel can use for 
screening depression and other mental disorders in their patients. Often these tests come in forms of 
different types of questionnaires that either the medical professional or the patient can fill in. Most 
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of these tests are in textual form (unless they are spoken out loud by the medical professional), and 
most often they include questions that are answered along a scale. When answering these tests, the 
patient can often predict what sort of an outcome the test will give about their current state as they 
are often quite simple and the answers can have, for example, different numbers that are easy to 
connect to the final result of the test. An example of this will be given in the case of the Beck 
Depression Inventory that will be analyzed later on in this chapter. 
 Different types of psychiatric tests are often used in addition to verbal information given by 
the patient during the therapy, but they are especially useful when one needs to assess the state of a 
patient quickly. The tests can also be used as a quick way of diagnosing different disorders, and they 
are especially useful when assessing the severity of a disorder the patient is already known to have. 
Remaking of these tests can also be used as indication of whether the patient's state has gotten 
worse or better by comparing their previous and current results. The fact that psychiatric tests can 
be used for diagnosing makes them particularly interesting for the analysis of 4.48 Psychosis, since 
this allows the audience or the reader to diagnose the patient themselves. These types of tests also 
serve as clear examples of the medicalization of mental disorders, as they bring forth the act of 
assessing and diagnosing a mental disorder to a patient. 
 In 4.48 Psychosis the psychiatric tests become evident in the text itself, as the patient 
evaluates herself through them. Oftentimes these tests are not recognized as such by critics, and 
therefore I consider it important to bring out the medical nature of these “list of numbers of 
unknown significance” or “random spread of numbers” (Urban 2001, 44, Rees 2012, 132). There 
are long passages in the play in which the patient lists her answers to the tests, and these are 
intertwined with her own verbal assessments of her state. In the very beginning of the play the 
patient is citing her answers to, or currently answering, one of the most used tests for screening 
depression, the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI or BDI-II for the newer version). The BDI was 
created in 1961 by Aaron T. Beck et al., and it uses 21 questions which have four different answers 
each, all scoring the answers from zero to three points. The basic premise of the test is the more 
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points one gets, the more depressed they are (the results range from zero to 63).  
Some of the citations or answers of the patient differ slightly from the original BDI form, 
and she does list some things that are not in the BDI. However, it is clear that at least to some extent 
she uses the BDI or BDI-II as a basis of evaluating herself and her state. Compare the following 
statements from the patient to those of the BDI and/or BDI-II. Here are the statements of the 
patient: 
I am sad 
I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve 
I am bored and dissatisfied with everything 
I am a complete failure as a person 
I am guilty, I am being punished 
I would like to kill myself 
I used to be able to cry but now I am beyond tears 
I have lost interest in other people 
I can't make decisions (2000, 206) 
 
Here are the same statements from the BDI (where the form of the patient matches the BDI-II 
better, I have used that and marked it with an asterisk): 
I am sad all the time* [or] I am blue or sad all the time and I can't snap out of it 
I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve 
I am dissatisfied with everything 
I feel I am a complete failure as a person (parent, husband, wife) 
I feel quite guilty [or] I feel guilty about many things I have done or should have done/I 
feel guilty most of the time/I feel guilty all the time* 
I feel I am being punished or will be punished 
I would like to kill myself* 
I used to be able to cry but now I can't cry at all even though I want to 
I have lost most of my interest in other people and have little feeling for them [or] I 
have lost all my interest in other people and don't care about them at all 
I can't make decisions any more without help [or] I can't make any decisions at all 
anymore (Beck et al. 1961 and 1996) 
 
As one can see, the statements are almost or completely identical between the patient and the BDI 
or BDI-II, which supports my argument that the patient is evaluating herself at least partly through 
the means of her treatment, particularly through the psychiatric tests that are used on her.  
Different types of tests are perhaps the clearest parts of the treatment from the viewpoint of 
the patient, and they can often be easily understood without extensive knowledge of medicine, 
psychiatry or psychotherapy. Unlike the notes made by medical personnel, the tests provide 
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methods of assessing one's illnesses that are both available for the patients and possibly even easily 
understandable (for instance, the BDI(-II) where the amount of points corresponds to the supposed 
amount of depression). Here, if one would analyze the answers the patient has given, her result of 
the test questions that are answered in the play would range from two to three, but being mostly 
threes, which would indicate severe depression. As the part resembling the BDI(-II) is on the very 
first pages of the play, it sets the tone for the patient’s condition for the rest of the play. Positioning 
the BDI(-II) on the first pages of the play is an interesting choice, since there is no actual diagnosis 
present in the play, but the condition of the patient has to be interpreted through her answers to the 
psychiatric tests appearing in the play. The only actual mention towards a diagnostic state is in the 
title of the play, 4.48 Psychosis, however, one should note that psychosis in itself is usually a 
symptom in a disorder rather than a diagnosis itself (e.g. psychotic depression, different psychotic 
disorders). 
 What I consider significant in the passage in which the patient in answering the BDI(-II) 
questionnaire, is that intertwined with the answers to the actual questionnaire are some of the 
patient's own assessments of her state, such as: “I am fat,” “I cannot love,” “I cannot make love,” 
“my hips are too big,” and “I cannot be alone” (2000, 207). It would seem the patient adds her own 
analysis of why she is as depressed as she is, and does it in the same form as her answers to the 
questionnaire. The patient’s own added commentary turns the impersonal questionnaire form from 
“faceless to the particular,” highlighting the patient’s own experience and narration of her depressed 
state (Claycomb 2012, 102). Perhaps her own additions could even be regarded as her way of letting 
the doctor know about the issues she would like to discuss or what she thinks the doctor should be 
pointing their attention to instead of the questions of the questionnaire. If one would take this 
reading, it could be elaborated to an understanding of the patient trying to take agency in regards to 
her own treatment, or even as the patient trying to fight against the methods of the therapy and/or 
the therapist. This could be supported by the oppositional silences analyzed in chapter 4.1.2, which 
could also be read as taking agency in the psychotherapeutic treatment. 
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 Another typical method of assessing the mental state of a patient is the Mental State 
Evaluation, or the MSE. Unlike the BDI(-II) which is quite typical a test in its textual form and 
multiple choice answers and gives an answer to whether or not the patient is depressed, the MSE 
offers a sort of brief summary of the person in question as a whole, a “snapshot of a patient’s 
behavioural and psychological functioning”. The MSE includes the patient's appearance, behavior, 
mood and affect, speech, cognitive state, thoughts and their content, and abnormalities in 
perception, insight, and judgement. (Goldberg & Murray 2006, 64-68). There is also a shorter 
version of the MSE called the Mini-mental State Examination. What is important in both of these in 
regards to 4.48 Psychosis is that both of them use a test for screening cognitive abilities, particularly 
concentration, called serial sevens. The test in serial sevens is simply counting backwards from 100 
in series of seven (100, 93, 86 etc.). The test can be used for different kinds of purposes: besides 
screening for cognitive effects of mental disorders, it can be used for example to evaluate the 
severity of head trauma. When analyzing the serial sevens test, the medical professional should take 
note of both the answers (are they correct) and the time it takes for the patient to give the answers 
(Goldberg & Murray 2006, 68). 
 In 4.48 Psychosis there are two parts in which the serial sevens is used. The first time this 
occurs in the beginning of the play, the patient cannot get the counting right, and the numbers she 
utters are in no particular order: “100, 91, 84, 81” etc. (2000, 208). This numeric indication of her 
state would allow the reader to interpret that she may not be at her full mental capacity. Her fail on 
the serial sevens may be caused by a decrease in her cognitive abilities, which is typical during 
depression. Besides failing the serial sevens test, the numbers are presented in a cloud-like layout 
on the page, which further indicates a sort of scattered sense of the patient's mind-set. The first time 
the serial sevens appears in the play is very early on, and one can assume that in the beginning of 
the play the mental status of the patient is quite poor, based on the serial sevens test, the BDI(-II) 
test analyzed earlier, and the fact that she talks about committing suicide (“I have decided to 
commit suicide,” “I have resigned myself to death this year” (2000, 207-208). Although serial 
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sevens is not by itself a diagnostic device, it still provides valuable information about the cognitive 
state of the patient.  
When the serial sevens occurs the second time towards the end of the play, the patient does 
get the counting right, and this time the numbers are neatly placed one below each other, 
emphasizing the clearness and organized nature of her mind at that moment. The second time the 
serial sevens occurs in the play it is preceded by a scene which is highly fragmented in form and 
content, giving indication to the shattered mind-set of the patient at the time. The placement of the 
second serial sevens test is best described by the citation in the scene following it, “Sanity is found 
at the centre of convulsion, where madness is scorched from the bisected soul” (2000, 233). If one 
was to take the correct answers to the serial sevens as proof of “sanity,” it would indeed be found 
just after one of the most fragmented and incoherent scenes in the play, after which the patient starts 
to sound more lucid, talking about recovery with the help of her doctor. After the second serial 
sevens the patient states: “I know myself / I see myself” (2000, 233), indicating that the result of the 
serial sevens correlates to the lucidity of her mind.  
 The patient in 4.48 Psychosis often gives long lists of depictions of her mental and physical 
state (e.g. 206-208), and these provide an important means of understanding how she sees herself 
and her illness. Particularly important are the parts where her self-assessment intertwines with 
medical models of assessment, because it helps to confirm my hypothesis that psychiatric care 
affects the self-image of the patient in ways that cannot simply be classified as recovery. As the self-
reflective abilities of the patient often develop during therapy, they can start thinking about 
themselves and their current mental states through the means used in the therapeutic sessions. They 
can evaluate their mental well-being using the same tests used by medical personnel and in this way 
the treatment may affect their lives more permanently. Of course, the knowledge and understanding 
of the self that is essential to therapy will also remain with the patients. This differs greatly from the 
possibilities of evaluating one's physical well-being because analyzing even the most basic medical 
test, such as a blood test for example, takes extensive medical knowledge gained from education in 
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the subject. 
 Although the last questionnaire or test I shall introduce is not one commonly used in 
psychiatric or therapeutic practices, it is worth mentioning because of its significant relation to the 
content of the play. In The Suicidal Mind (1996) Edwin S. Shneidman discusses the Murray Need 
Form, originally developed by Henry A. Murray in 1938 (1996, 18-20). The basis of the Murray 
Need Form is a list of twenty basic needs people have, and it works by each individual rating the 
needs they have from the most important to least important. Individuals rate each need with a score 
they see fit from a scale of 0 to 100, so that the entire score of all their needs add up to 100 (e.g. one 
might rate the needs to achieve something as 20, the need of admiration and support as 5 etc.). The 
number assigned to each need correlates to the person's desire to attain it, and the higher the 
number, the more crucial the need is. This also means that the order in which different needs are 
placed is not important, only the numbers reflecting the importance of each need. In his book 
Shneidman uses the Murray Need Form in rating the most important needs of patients that have 
tried to commit suicide in the past, and showcases how the different needs of people affect their 
actions, and how this should be taken into account in their psychotherapy. 
 In 4.48 Psychosis the patient lays out a list of needs, some of which are almost or 
completely identical to that of the Murray Need Form. Consider the following content, the first one 
from the patient's list and the second from the Murray Need Form: 
To overcome obstacles and attain high standard 
To overcome opposition 
To have control and influence over others 
To defend myself 
To defend my psychological space 
To vindicate the ego 
To excite, amaze, fascinate, shock, intrigue, amuse, entertain or entice others 
To be independent and act according to desire 
To obliterate past humiliation by resumed action 
To feed, help, protect, comfort, console, support, nurse or heal 
To be loved (2000, 233-235). 
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To accomplish something difficult; to overcome. 
To overcome opposition forcefully; fight, attack. 
To control, influence, and direct others; dominate. 
To protect the self and one's psychological space. 
To vindicate the self against criticism or blame. 
To excite, fascinate, amuse, entertain others. 
To be independent and free; to shake of restraint. 
To avoid humiliation and embarrassment. 
To feed, help, console, protect, nurture another. 
To have one's needs gratified; to be loved. (1996, 20) 
 
Yet again, it is clear that a psychiatric practice has affected the patient so that she analyzes herself in 
the same manner as the test does. In this particular section she may either be currently doing the 
Murray Need Form, recalling her answers to the test or just reciting the different needs listed in the 
test. She lists her needs, many of which are identical in nature of those listed in the Murray Need 
Form, and as in the case of the BDI(-II), she adds her own definitions of her needs amongst the 
definitions of the test. Some of her own additions include: “to receive attention,” “to be seen and 
heard,” “to defy convention,” and “to be forgiven” (2000, 234-235). Unlike with the BDI(-II), with 
the Murray Need Form there is less of the patient's own statements than those of the test. Perhaps 
this could be read as a positive attribute to the Murray Need Form because it could be more 
comprehensive in its listing and therefore has accounted for almost all of the basic needs of a 
person, resulting in the patient having to add only a few needs of her own to the test. 
 Interestingly, there is one part of the need form in which the patient has turned the need the 
other way round: “to be fed, helped, protected, comforted, consoled, supported, nursed or healed,” 
whereas the original (which she also states) is: “to feed, help, console, protect, nurture another” 
(2000, 235, 1996, 20). It could be read that in this part the patient explicitly states her need of help 
from others in her situation of mental illness. As the reader cannot be sure whether the list the 
patient utters is a monologue with herself or a situation in therapy in which she is filling out the 
Murray Need Form, one might either conclude that she is allowing herself to feel helpless and 
recognize the fact that she needs outside medical help in her state, or she might be stating her need 
of help to her psychotherapist. Either way, this is not the only time in the play when she admits 
needing help, as after the Murray Need Form she has commented on her therapist as her “last hope” 
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(2000, 236), and comments many times on how she feels the doctor is the only one who could save 
her.  
 I consider the final three statements in the need list of the patient the most important ones: 
“to be forgiven / to be loved / to be free” 2000, 235). These needs are expressed in the simplest 
manner out of all of those in her need list, and this could be taken to mean that these needs are the 
most urgent ones the patient has. The simplicity of the statements of the needs could be argued to 
represent the most basic, most essential needs. The fact that these three needs are listed last should 
hold no meaning, since if the patient would be answering to the test correctly, she would need to 
give numbers reflecting the importance of each need, not list them in different ways. Although none 
of the needs are numbered in order of priority, the fact that the patient cites “to be loved” two times 
in the play might suggest that this would be her most important need (2000, 235, 243). The second 
time the need emerges is at the very end of the play, where the patient states “this vital need for 
which I would die / to be loved” (2000, 242-3). This gives evidence that the need to be loved would 
indeed be her most urgent one, as it is the one for which she would die. 
 As discussed in this chapter, it is clear that the therapeutic methods affect the patient even 
out of therapy. Although one cannot always be sure whether the patient is currently in therapy when 
citing her answers, these sections of the play give clear evidence as to the impact of the psychiatric 
tests on the patient. The fact that in most cases she is not simply answering the questions or doing 
the tasks in each test (expect in the case of the serial sevens, in which she tries to do exactly what 
the test asks her to), she remodels the answers to suit her own states of being. It would be unlikely 
that a therapist would allow her to do this as this would affect the test results or even make them 
impossible to analyze as the questions and answers would no longer match. Because of this it can be 
argued that the answers the patient states during the play are not happening in therapeutic sessions 
but on her own time of self-reflection, which would indicate that the tests have left some sort of an 
impact on her as she continues answering to them and evaluating her well-being through them even 
out of therapy. 
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Given that there is no actual diagnosis present in the play, one could argue that the position 
of the doctor and the process of diagnosing is given to the audience or the reader, who could 
analyze the test results of the patient and then come to a conclusion of her state. This reading could 
be confirmed by the fact that in order to understand the lists in the play as answers to medical 
questionnaires requires some knowledge of psychiatry or psychotherapy. This brings forth the 
question of medicalization and medical power, which in this case would be granted to the audience 
or the reader. If one was to analyze the audience or the reader as the medical professional, it would 
complicate their position considerably, as in the play it becomes evident that medicine is not able to 
help the patient and the character of the doctor is quite problematic. Therefore this could force the 
audience or the reader to feel the suicide of the patient as a result of them not being able to help the 
patient. This type of a reading would certainly fit the context of in-yer-face theatre, where the 
audience is often forced to feel uncomfortable for one reason or another.  
These types of affects, emotions and identifications that 4.48 Psychosis might set in the 
audience have not been widely studied. Alicia Tycer has elaborated on the effects the play has on its 
audience, but the focus of her studies has been on how 4.48 Psychosis affects the audience by using 
Sigmund Freud’s melancholia as a central notion and developing this into the ideas of melancholic 
identification and witnessing (2008). However, Tycer has also noted the power positions that come 
into play for the audience, analyzing these through the division of “Victim. Perpetrator. Bystander.” 
that appears in the play itself, but in her analysis she has not commented on the possibilities of 
transferring the medical power to the audience (2008, 32). 
 As psychiatric tests can be seen as results of medicalization of certain mental states, the fact 
that the patient reflects on herself through these tests is of particular importance. Here the reader is 
faced with the question of whether or not they believe mental diseases actually exist or whether 
these disorders are merely a result of the medicalization of deviance. The effects of medicalization 
become clear in the character of the patient in the sense that she uses methods used by medical 
professionals in aid of diagnosing their patients as means of reflecting her own mental states outside 
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of medical contact. Simply put, the patient assesses herself in a way that is used to assess mental 
disorders, meaning that she has internalized the language of medical discourse and in a Foucaultian 
style she seems to be surveilling herself via the medical procedures known to her. Even outside a 
psychotherapeutic session, she continues to test herself and how severe her illness could be 
perceived. One could argue that she has adopted the medical questionnaires into her self-reflexivity, 
and therefore medicalization has become a part of assessing and compiling her sense of self.  
 
4.2.2 Forcing the Medicine 
 
The use of psychopharmaceutics is based on the idea that mental illnesses can be seen as an 
imbalance of the brain, and the drugs help the patients by altering the neurochemistry of the brain 
(Blum and Stratuzzi 2004, 270). As Linda M. Blum and Nena F. Stracuzzi note, in the case of 
treating mental illness with psychopharmaceuticals, “the mind is primarily of the body” (2004, 
270), meaning that the “mind” or “soul” is seen as an outcome of the physiological base of the 
human body. Mental disorders are often seen as diseases of the mind rather than the matter that is 
the human body, but the use of psychofarmaceuticals in treatment of mental diseases alters this view 
to a more biological one. 
 In 4.48 Psychosis, there are several notions of the patient receiving different types of 
medication, although at the beginning she states she is “terrified of medication” and she even begs 
for the doctor to: “Please. Don't switch off my mind by attempting to straighten me out” (2000, 207, 
220). I have discussed medical power and authority before in this thesis, and the continual 
prescription of psychofarmaceuticals is one of the most significant and concrete examples of the use 
of it in 4.48 Psychosis. From a feminist perspective this forms a clear point of intersectional 
difference in the play, as the level of power the character of the doctor possesses is clearly above 
that of the patient, and here the educational background (often also indicative of a social 
background) allows the character of the doctor to influence the care of the patient even against her 
original wishes. The prescription of drugs for a mental disorder is also a clear example of the results 
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of the medicalization of the mental illness in question, as prescription drugs can only be prescribed 
when there is a valid reason for this, such as a diagnosis. In the play the patient is clearly against 
taking medicine, but her doctor persuades her to do so and she believes them because of their 
supposed knowledge of what would be best for her. This surrendering of one’s agency reflects the 
functionalist view of medical power introduced in chapter 2.2, in which the patient allows the 
doctor to make the decisions for them because their authority has been earned by beneficent actions 
and altruism. However, one could argue that in the play the doctor does not showcase any particular 
altruism towards the patient, nor do they seem especially beneficent. 
After the doctor tells the patient she is “allowing” her situation that they call a “state of 
desperate absurdity,” the patient finally gives in: “Okay, let's do it, let's do the drugs, let's do the 
chemical lobotomy, let's shut down the higher functions of my brain and perhaps I'll be a bit more 
fucking capable of living” (2000, 221). It is clear that the patient is afraid of medicine interfering 
with the functions of her brain so that she would not be able to “think” or “work” (2000, 220). It is 
problematic that she accepts the medicine so she could be, as she states, “a bit more fucking capable 
of living,” as this reminds the reader of her doctor’s questions of what she offers her friends that 
was analyzed in chapter 4.1.1 (2000, 221). As the patient is already living in a physical sense of the 
word, one must assume that the hoped effect of the medicine is to allow her to live on the norms of 
modern society: productive, effective and beneficial to society and the market economy. Here the 
criticism of psychotherapy by Masson, introduced in chapter 3.2 and further analyzed in chapter 
4.1.1, becomes yet again evident: it is clear that the doctor is trying to mold the patient to the norms 
of society by means of medicine.  
The actions of the doctor could be seen as beneficent if one is to believe that the only way to 
be a part of society would be to be (mentally) healthy, and from this perspective the functionalist 
view of medical power would be justified, as the patient would benefit from the expertise of their 
doctor. Also, if the medicine actually helped the patient, the persuasion to take it could be seen as 
more justified. A lot depends on the type of ethical background the doctor has, however, these are 
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not made present in the play. It is still possible to criticize the actions of the doctor regarding the 
patient’s treatment by drugs, since, firstly, the medication prescribed did not help the patient and she 
had to be induced to take the medicine against her initial judgement on the matter, and secondly, 
because the price to be living in any society should not be as extreme as having to try out several 
different types of medication that may have severe side-effects. In the case of 4.48 Psychosis this is 
especially notable, as most of the medicine the patient takes seem to make her situation even worse.  
The questions remains one of medical power and the ethics of the medical personnel: to 
which point are they allowed to continue treatment in a way they deem most beneficial to the 
patient, even though the patient would suffer during their processes of trial-and-error. As discussed 
in chapter 2.1, the prominent view of medical professionals in Western societies is that of a 
beneficent, humanitarian worker in whose expertise patients trust. This can result in patients 
allowing their doctors to make all decisions for them, as they believe the doctors sincerely try to act 
on what would be best for their patients. Nowadays differing opinions are on the rise, as people are 
growing suspicious of the connections between drug companies and medical professionals, and 
therefore the questions of medical power in the case of prescribing drugs is becoming more 
problematic. As the trade of medicine is not very transparent in itself or in its relations to drug 
companies, it is difficult to properly criticize the use of prescription drugs in cases such as the one 
presented in 4.48 Psychosis, which, though being fictional, represents what is reality for many a 
patient with mental disorders. 
 In the play the patient receives eight different types of medicine for her illness until she 
refuses further treatment and tries to commit suicide by taking loads of aspirin combined with wine 
(“100 aspirin and one bottle of Bulgarian Cabernet Sauvignon,” 2000, 223). The exact drugs used 
for the patient are: Sertraline, Zopiclone, Melleril, Lofepramine, Citalopram, Fluoxetine 
hydrochloride, Thorazine and Venlafaxine (Melleril and Thorazine are trade names of drugs 
whereas the others are names of the general compound). It seems almost every type of 
psychofarmaceutical medicine available has been tried with the patient: Sertraline, Citalopram and 
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Fluoxetine hydrochloride are drugs that inhibit the reuptake of serotonin in the brain, so called 
SSRIs (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor), Melleril and Thorazine are antipsychotics, 
Lofepramine is a tricyclic antidepressant, Venlafaxine an SNRI antidepressant (a serotonin-
norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor), and Zopiclone is a hypnotic taken for insomnia (Aldrich 1999, 
135, Goldberg & Murray 2006, 210, Kinsella & Kinsella 2006, 56, Hermann et al. 2009, 49, Katona 
et al. 2012, 78).  
The epicrisis of the patient shows how she reacts to each drug, and the side effects include 
such as “wants to die,” “increase in suicidal thoughts,” “delusional ideas,” “paranoid thoughts,” 
“short term memory loss,” and “tremors” (2000, 223-224). The side effects of the medicine are both 
psychological and physical, and in most cases they are quite severe and worsen her state even 
further. Sometimes it may be hard to separate the side effects from the actual illness, as in some 
cases the side effects can be exactly the same as the typical symptoms of the disorder (e.g. SSRI 
drugs can cause thoughts of self-harm when starting the treatment). Generally it is thought that new 
symptoms that have started after taking a particular medicine are considered side effects rather than 
symptoms of the disease, but of course it may sometimes be difficult to know where to draw the 
line between these two.  
 In scenarios such as the one presented in 4.48 Psychosis, one must question whether it is 
acceptable to force medication on people who do not wish to take it. Some see mental disease as 
mere lack of certain neurotransmitters, and in this case medicine would indeed be a perfectly valid 
choice of treatment. Also, some patients do benefit from medication, and in some cases one needs to 
try at least some medication before being allowed further treatment, for example, being committed 
to a mental institution. However, Conrad and Schneider point out that physicians sometimes neglect 
the rights and wishes of their patients, which is what seems to have happened in the play (1992, 35). 
Here the reader is faced with the issue of one's right to their own bodily autonomy versus the 
obligation of physicians to try to heal their patients. The question of bodily autonomy has been 
central to feminist criticism and theorization for many decades, and although it has typically 
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covered issues such as abortion, contraception or the sexual rights of women, the question of 
medication and medicalization can easily be linked to the matter, as discussed previously in chapter 
2.3, where I have presented the case of DES, a prescription drug solely for the use of women during 
pregnancy.  
On the question of bodily autonomy in the case of mental illness there are a few notions that 
should be acknowledged. On the one hand one must question whether a mentally ill patient can be 
trusted to be capable of making their own decisions when it comes to their treatment, but on the 
other, is it humane to force medicine upon someone against their will? The main problem of this 
dilemma, besides the obvious right to self-autonomy, is the fact that one can never be sure whether 
a sick patient is themselves, “in their right minds,” so to speak. It would perhaps be easier to allow a 
person to decide for their treatment if one could be sure that the disease would not cloud their 
judgement. The question of involuntary treatment by psychoactive drugs is very complicated, and 
one cannot easily compare it to another medical situations where a patient denies their treatment 
(for example in the case of a terminally ill patient or people of certain religions that forbid some 
forms of medical treatment). 
 The question of forcing the treatment relates to the involuntary incarceration which I 
discussed earlier on in chapters 2.1 and 2.2. In most Western countries involuntary treatment is used 
only as a last resort, and usually the patient needs to be in danger of hurting themselves or others or 
that no other form of treatment has worked in order for them to be put under involuntary treatment. 
Nowadays involuntary treatment is restricted by mental health laws, and there are different criteria 
in different countries and states that need to be fulfilled in order for the treatment to be legal. 
Although persuading a patient into taking medicine and treating them involuntarily in mental 
institutions are two very different things, it is still troubling to wonder when does the persuasion 
and coaxing turn into involuntary treatment but just by the means of drugs. As in the case of the 
patient in 4.48 Psychosis the drugs prescribed to her either did not work or made her feel even 
worse, it should be carefully considered when to order patients to take medication, especially if they 
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are not initially willing to do so. I am not arguing that any patient should feel the negative side 
effects of medicine, but I would assume that if one would take their the medicine willingly from the 
beginning they could be better equipped to deal with the possible repercussions.  
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5. The Collapse of the Textual Form and the Self 
I will now move to the third, and final, part of my thesis: analyzing the relationship between the 
dramatic form and the subjective experience of the self of the patient in 4.48 Psychosis. As both the 
text and the patient can be seen to go through different states or phases, it is interesting to examine 
whether these two correlate together and how the physical form of the text on page can reflect the 
mental states of the patient. I will examine whether it is possible to notice the fragmentary nature of 
her self-image through the layout of the text of the play and through other features of the text, such 
as intertextual references. I will also analyze how the medical procedures can be seen in correlation 
to the different states of the patient’s mind and self-image, linking the third part of the thesis to the 
previously analyzed material. 
 
5.1 Fragmentation of Textual Form in Literature 
 
As most of my theoretical basis of analysis in this chapter originates from postmodernist theory, a 
brief notion of postmodernism will prove useful in understanding this theory in its context. 
Although the exact history and origins of the term remain uncertain, the first traceable uses of the 
word postmodern were in the 1930's and 1940's by Federico de Onís and Dudley Fitts (Hassan 
2001, 115). Postmodernism is not easily defined, and some theorists even claim it defies definition. 
Postmodernism can be seen as a reaction to modernism, and because of this it can be said that there 
exists as many forms of postmodernism or postmodernisms as there are modernisms.   
Ihab Hassan claims in his book The Postmodern Turn that postmodernism can be seen as a 
“significant revision, if not the original episteme, of the twentieth-century Western societies” (2001, 
114). Hassan defines postmodernism as “a number of related cultural tendencies, a constellation of 
values, a repertoire of procedures and attitudes,” and adds that postmodernism is “an artistic, 
philosophical, and social phenomenon” that:  
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veers towards open, playful, optative, provisional (open in time as well as structure or 
space), disjunctive or indeterminate forms, a discourse of ironies and fragments, a 
“white ideology” of absences and fragments, a desire of diffractions, an invocation of 
complex, articulate silences. (2001, 115, 124).  
According to Hassan the defining feature of postmodernism is what he calls indetermanence, a 
neologism of indeterminacy (defined by a large category of terms of unmaking, such as 
deconstruction, displacement, and demystification, and terms such as ambiguity, discontinuity, 
randomness, perversion, and deformation) and immanence (“the capacity of the mind to generalize 
itself in symbols […] and so become, increasingly, im-mediately [sic] its own environment”) (2001, 
122-123). 
 Bennet and Royle argue in An Introduction to Literature, Criticism and Theory that the 
characteristic form of postmodern literature is fragmentation, although it is not unique to it (1999, 
233-234). Fragmentation in postmodern literature is essentially different from the fragmentation of 
modern and romantic eras: unlike these eras, postmodern text does not depend on an “original unity 
that can be lost,” meaning that postmodern fragmentation is “without origins,” that is, the texts are 
disseminated without any origin or centre to go back to (1999, 234). This would mean, for example, 
that the fragmentary texts hold no hidden meanings that the reader could work out, but that the 
fragmentation is the natural state of the text. Annjeanette Wiese argues that “contemporary fiction 
[…] highlights and reclaims the importance of narrative structure in relation to identity and the 
human experience,” and it is interesting to see whether this argument could also be relevant to 4.48 
Psychosis, which is, after all, a product of contemporary, postmodern theatre (2012, 2). 
 Kerstin Schmidt argues that the main concern of postmodern theatre is “the exploration of 
the dramatic form” and that the main trait of postmodern drama is fragmentation (2005, 31, 20). In 
this sense Kane's 4.48 Psychosis seems to be an exceptionally good sample of postmodern drama. 
The dramatic form, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, is the most unconventional of all 
of Kane's plays with no clear characters, scenes, stage directions, or even a plot. The text itself is 
very fragmented and positioned on the page in a vast amount of different visual styles. Hassan 
discusses the turn from form (“conjunctive, closed”) to antiform (“disjunctive, open”) in 
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postmodern literature and notes that the “dramatic form seems to move from unresolved tensions to 
symbolic elusiveness, from the latter to surreal or expressionistic contortion, and finally comes to 
rest in absurdity” (2001, 40, 121). Hassan calls this new form of literature the literature of silence, 
which goes well with Maurice Blanchot's notion that postmodern literature seems to move towards 
its own disappearance (quoted in Hassan 2001, 42). In other words, “abstraction begets death” 
(Hassan, 2001, 44). 
 Before moving to the textual analysis of fragmentation in the play, I will examine some of 
the postmodern theories applied to the subject of identity, self or subject(ivity) in the field of 
postmodern theatre. The self can be examined from many perspectives: as a philosophical, 
psychological, and a social category (Schmidt 2005, 44). The importance of individualism has been 
considerable in the twentieth first century, but in postmodern theory and literature identity and the 
experience of the self have been questioned, deconstructed, and then reconstructed. Schmidt argues: 
“the Modern notion of an original unity of the self and of dramatic character as a given entity has 
been lost in both postmodern drama and postmodern discourses at large (2005, 47). In general the 
fragmentation of the self is already quite evident in drama because of the “actor/character split,” 
meaning that there is a certain actor performing as a certain character, and therefore neither the 
actor or the character as themselves are whole but they need the other to become fully embodied 
(Schmidt, 2005, 10). Postmodern drama, however, dives even deeper into the matter of self and 
regards it not as a “given entity but a construct [...] contingent upon its cultural context” (Schmidt 
2005, 45). 
 In 4.48 Psychosis it is interesting to examine whether the fragmentation of the textual form 
corresponds to the mental states of the patient. As I have explained before in the introduction, it is 
possible to read more than one voice for the character of the patient, which is particularly intriguing 
considering the general fragmented nature of the text. Karoline Gritzner has argued that in 4.48 
Psychosis the “thematic flights of the self from the world” can be seen reflecting in the 
experimental dramatic forms of the play (2008, 335). In the following chapters I will analyze how 
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this “experience of alienated and fragmented subjectivity” can be associated with the collapse of the 
dramatic form (Gritzner 2008, 336). 
 
5.2 “My Mind Is the Subject of These Bewildered Fragments”: Parallels between the Collapses of 
the Textual Form and the Patient’s Identity 
 
In 4.48 Psychosis both the textual form and the state of the patient appear to be highly fragmented. 
In this chapter I will study how the fragmentary nature of the text of the play can be seen in parallel 
to the fragmentation of the patient’s experience of herself. Watson states that the character of the 
patient in the play is “formed out of a profound fragmentation,” while Claycomb describes the 
character having “a deeply divided self” (2008, 191, 2012, 111). Watson divides the play as having 
stages of reflection and refraction that take turns in the mind of the patient (2008, 191). The 
fragmentation of the self of the patient becomes evident when reading the play, as there is no one 
style of speech that would somehow become typical to the patient. In a sense, the reader does not 
get a sense of a complete character but rather glimpses of different sides or different mental states of 
one character. Saunders has argued that 4.48 Psychosis could be seen as formations of different 
mindscapes, rather than actual events, places, or situations (2002, 225). It would seem as if the 
different emotions the patient experiences would guide her experience of herself and her 
environment, transforming her into several different personas with different expectations, dreams, 
hopes, fears or anxieties.  
 The text of the play offers several different forms: dialogues (between the patient and the 
doctor), monologues, lists, words and numbers that have been scattered on the page, and different 
types of visual formations of the aforementioned on the page. Although it seems there is no 
distinction between different scenes in the play as they seem to merge into one another, it is possible 
to distinguish 21 different scenes. As there are no pauses between scenes or “traditional act and 
scene divisions” (Tycer 2008, 26-27), the beginning of a new scene is always marked with “- - - - 
-”, which helps the reader to notice the subtle changes in the subject matter. However, the lack of 
clear pauses or intervals between the scenes causes them to merge into each other, and as there is no 
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clear setting in the play, all scenes can be performed straight after one another. In a way, the play is 
almost dream-like in form, as everything blends together without explanation as to why and how 
different events and episodes are happening. The form of the play as a whole could be read as a 
metaphor to the state of the patient’s mind whilst suffering from depression. Here, I consider it 
notable that the most lucid and non-fragmented textual content is found in dialogues with the 
character of the doctor, allowing an understanding of the more fragmentary forms to be products of 
the mind of the patient, and most likely her inner monologue. 
 The structure of the play can be argued to be non-linear as time or clear progress of the plot 
cannot be found in it (except the eventual process towards the suicide of the patient). The text offers 
numerous repetitions, and one could read these as evidence of non-linearity together with the 
evident lack of a clear plot. Tycer argues that this “non-linear structure of the play facilitates a 
trauma-based reading” (2008, 27). One could even argue that the scenes could be in any other order 
and that this would not change much on how the audience or the reader would view the play. 
Perhaps the only fixed point has to be the scene where the patient commits suicide, as this offers a 
form of closure to the play in regards to the very little plot there otherwise is.  
Some examples of non-linearity can be found right at the beginning of the play and towards 
the end of the play, where the exact same lines emerge: 
(A very long silence.) 
- But you have friends. 
(A long silence.) 
You have a lot of friends. 
What do you offer your friends to make them so supportive? 
(A long silence.) 
What do you offer your friends to make them so supportive? 
(A long silence.) 
What do you offer? 
(Silence.) (2000, 205, 236) 
 
As it is very unlikely that there would be two scenarios in the patient's psychotherapy sessions in 
which an identical discussion would be had, the reader can take this as evidence of the plays non-
linear structure. Possible further readings of the situation might be added, for example that the 
patient is re-living the therapy sessions in her mind and that would be why they do not appear to be 
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in a linear order. The non-linear structure could also be credited to the mental illness of the patient 
along the lines of what Tycer suggested, in which case one could regard the whole play as events 
and inner monologues in no linear order. Besides the example above where the lines are exactly 
identical in two different parts of the play, there are some recurring themes or clusters of words that 
occur in several parts of the play. One of these is the time 4.48, which is mentioned in the play five 
times altogether (2000, 207, 213, 229, 233, 242). The other recurring elements are the lines “Hatch 
opens / Stark light,” that occur four times in the play (2000, 225, 230, 239, 240) and the lines 
“Remember the light and believe the light,” that occur three times (2000, 206, 228, 229). As there 
are so many recurring dialogues and lines in the play, one could argue that the structure could be 
seen as cyclical. These cycles could be interpreted as different states or moods of the patient, or 
even different voices of the patient, if one would read the play as having more than one voice for 
the character. The fact that the play provides clear distinctions between lucid and more psychotic 
moments of the patient could be seen as evidence for the reading that the cycles represent different 
aspects or different states of lucidity of the patient. 
 Besides the general form of the play, the reader is allowed a sense of fragmentation through 
the patient’s statements on her own mental state. In the very beginning of the play, the patient 
states:  
a consolidated consciousness resides in a darkened banqueting hall near the ceiling of a 
mind whose floor shifts as ten thousand cockroaches when a shaft of light enters as all 
thought unite in an instant of accord body no longer expellent as the cockroaches 
comprise a truth which no one ever utters (2000, 205) 
 
Here, the reader can note how there are no punctuation marks or capital letters, only endless 
thought, which can be seen as evidence of inner monologue. The lines themselves are rather 
contradictory, as on the one hand a “consolidated consciousness” could be seen as a fortified, 
strengthened consciousness, but on the other, it could be read as a consciousness still formed out of 
fragments. “A mind whose floor shifts” gives a clear impression of a mind that is unstable, a mind 
without a permanent foundation. Although the paragraph cited above seems to only add to the sense 
of fragmentariness through its form, the patient does also give statements that clearly allow the 
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reader to understand the fragmentary nature of her mind. The patient herself seems to be at least 
somewhat aware of the fragmentariness of her state, as she comments: “And my mind is the subject 
of these bewildered fragments” and that she is a “fragmented puppet” (2000, 210, 229). The patient 
does not elaborate on what these bewildered fragments are but on the context of the statement one 
could read these fragments to be her thoughts, ideas, and in essence, her reality. She also comments: 
“I don’t know who I am” and depicts her mind as a “piecemeal crumple” (2000, 225). The 
fragmentation can also be read through the contradiction of her statements, such as “I do not want to 
die” and “I do not want to live” (2000, 207). Also, contrary to her previous statement of not 
knowing herself, she later on states: “I know myself” (2000, 233). The last statement the patient 
makes, “It is myself I have never met, whose face is pasted on the underside of my mind” (2000, 
245), gives the clearest example of how the patient views her never being quite in touch with 
herself. 
The textual content offers plenty of evidence of the fragmentary nature of the patient’s 
mind, and when combined with the actual form of the text and its formation on page, the reader can 
clearly see how utterly fragmented the mind of the patient is. I have mentioned before that more 
than one voice can be read to the character of the patient, and I will now showcase why this is. Here 
is an example from the discourse of the patient: 
I’m dying for one who doesn’t care 
I’m dying for one who doesn’t know 
 
   you’re breaking me 
Speak 
Speak 
Speak 
 
   ten yard ring of failure 
   look away from me (2000, 243.) 
 
Here, the thought process is clearly divided into two distinct voices separated on the page. The other 
voice speaks first, the other answering or commenting on the first. The distinction becomes clear 
from the visual separation on the page, and added to this the other voice has capital letters in the 
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beginning of its lines while the other one does not. The citation I used above is from the last pages 
of the play, and it should be noted that the fragmentation transforms from appearing mostly in the 
written content (such as the citations analyzed previously) to appearing also in the form of the text. 
Compare, for example, these two extracts, one from the beginning and the other from the very end 
of the play: 
I had a night in which everything was revealed to me. 
How can I speak again? (2000, 205.) 
 
in death you hold me 
never free (2000, 244.) 
 
The first citation has two grammatically correct sentences with capital letters and punctuation 
marks, whereas the second citation is spread all over the page, and the lines seem like poetry or 
shattered thought. This type of evolution towards the fragmentation of form and escape from 
traditional formatting of text is clearly visible on page, and it guides the reader towards regarding 
the mental state of the patient as deteriorating towards the end of the play. Eventually, this is what 
happens as the patient commits suicide, and the major state of fragmentation the patient experiences 
could be seen as one of the reasons for this. 
 The most crucial point of fragmentation for the patient seems to be the loss of her original, 
“essential self” (2000, 229). The patient describes her states as being either “charmed by vile 
delusions of happiness” or as being “in her right mind” (2000, 229). It seems the patient sees that 
there are two sides to her being: the state of being her essential self and sane, and the state of being 
charmed and therefore insane or mentally incapable. These two states form the discourse of the 
patient, dividing the textual form and content to that of clear and easily understandable and that of 
fragmented and cryptic text. The patient describes her state: “Sanity is found at the centre of 
convulsion, where madness is scorched from the bisected soul” (2000, 233). Here, the dividedness 
of the mind or the soul is stated, and the patient clearly sees her existence as being categorized by 
either sanity or madness. Other ways to read this dichotomy will be analyzed in the following 
chapter. 
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5.3 “Body and Soul Can Never Be Married”: The Separation between the Body and the Mind 
 
Now that we have established some of the fragmentary nature of the psyche of the character of the 
patient and its connections to the textual form, I would like to draw attention to the divide between 
the body and the mind that is repeated throughout the play. Although the play seems to ignore some 
of the more traditional binaries, such as gender, it does bring forth one of the most universal 
binaries: the one between the mind/soul and the body/matter. This division surfaces through the 
character of the patient, to whom it seems to cause anguish. 
 The character of the patient comments on her body and how she does not feel belonging in it 
several times during the play. The patient lists things she does not like about her body while she 
lists reasons why she is depressed early on in the play. On the other hand, the patient lists external 
factors that she does not care for in herself (“I am fat,” “My hips are too big,” “I dislike my 
genitals”), and on the other she lists ways in which her body does not function properly (“I can’t 
eat,” “I can’t sleep,” “I can’t think”) (2000, 206-207). Some of these functions are quite easily 
related to the mental illness affecting her cognitive abilities, some are more physical in nature. It is 
clear that these bodily sensations are somehow attached to her illness, either as a cause or as a 
symptom of it. The body seems to be a concrete place where the mental illness can channel into.  
It should be noted that the patient tries to feel better through punishing her body by means of 
cutting herself, which can be seen as a desperate measure of trying to connect the mind and the 
body (2000, 216-218). It seems that although she does not like her body as it is, she is not trying to 
mend it more to her liking but using it as a means of both discipline and momentarily comfort by 
mutilating herself. Here, the body is simultaneously the source of both pain and pleasure, 
hopelessness and hope. However, the patient also includes physical means to her suicide plans and 
her eventual suicide, namely by cutting her wrists and hanging herself, along with taking an 
overdose (2000, 210-211, 241). Although the body could be seen as a source of momentarily release 
in the form of cutting oneself, it also allows the patient a more permanent way to end her pain by 
“killing the body” and herself with it. 
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 The patient states the disconnection she feels between her body and her mind several times 
during the play. Early on in the play while referring to her previous doctors she states: “And I am 
deadlocked by that smooth psychiatric voice of reason which tells me there is an objective reality in 
which my mind and body are one” (2000, 209). This is an indication that the disconnection she feels 
has been a factor in her illness for some time now, as even her previous doctors have been trying to 
treat it. After this she notes: “But I am not here and never have been” (2000, 209), which can be 
read in at least two different ways. The patient could either mean that she feels she has not been 
physically or mentally present in her life or in society, whichever she uses “here” to refer to. On the 
one hand it is the objective reality that her body is, in fact, present in the world, and on the other it 
can be assumed that her mind is as well, otherwise she could not even try to be treated by means of 
psychotherapy. Either way, the disconnection the patient expresses with her material self and her 
mind could be used to argue either of the points presented above. However, I think it can be said 
with some certainty that she also feels a disconnection from the world or society, which is probably 
caused by the disconnection she feels about her mind and body. If one does not feel connected 
within themselves, it is hard to imagine how they could feel connection with anything else either.  
 As the play progresses, the disconnection between the patient’s mind and body continues. 
The patient states: “Body and soul can never be married” and continues with “I need to become 
who I already am and will bellow forever at this incongruity which has committed me to hell” 
(2000, 212). The statement allows the reader to understand that the disconnection between the mind 
and body could be a possible cause for her mental illness, although one might also argue that it is a 
symptom of it. However, at least the patient seems to consider the incongruity between the mind 
and the matter as a reason for her “hell” which can easily be understood as meaning her mental 
illness. Later on she states: “How can I return to form / now that my formal thought has gone?” 
(2000, 213). This notion could be read as a contradiction to her previous statement which gave the 
impression that the source of her illness would be the disconnection between the mind and the body. 
The later statement could, however, be read in a reversed manner, claiming that the original cause of 
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her illness would have been the loss of “formal thought” which stops her from feeling the 
connection to her “form”. After this she states that her mental illness is “the sickness that breeds in 
the folds of my mind” (2000, 213), supporting the latter interpretation of the origin of her illness. 
When trying to analyze the origin of her mental problems, one needs to understand that in 
scientific discourse the mind is seen to be of the body, and therefore such a binary opposition as 
presented above could not be made as such. This does not, however, prevent the reader from 
analyzing what the patient considers the reason for her mental illness. As this thesis concentrates on 
the subjective experience of the patient, the impression she has on her own state is essential to the 
analysis as a whole. The extracts analyzed in this chapter have pointed towards the patient feeling 
most disconcerted about the profound division she feels between her mind and her body. 
 The clear division of body and mind brings forth the question of gender minorities, 
especially from the feminist perspective used through this thesis. Gender minorities are often noted 
to include transgender and intersex people. Transgender people do not identify with the sex they 
were assigned at birth, whereas the term cisgender is used to refer to people who do identify with 
the sex they were assigned at birth. Transgender people may identify as women, men, both, or 
something outside the stereotypical gender binary, so the scale is extensive. There are also intersex 
people, in whose case sex cannot be assigned at birth as they are not simply just female or male 
from a biological perspective. Although I have previously stated the character of the patient to be a 
woman, this reading can be challenged from the perspective of the body/mind divide apparent in the 
character. As the patient does refer to herself as a woman this self-identification should be 
respected, but in the evidence of the apparent dichotomy between her mind and body one could 
argue that the character would not necessarily be a ciswoman. Adding a more queer reading to the 
play, the character of the patient could be read as a transwoman, as this would not erase her own 
sense of herself as a woman (which she states several times) but would allow the reader to consider 
the division the patient states there is between her body and mind.  
Queer is both an academic theory and an activist movement born in the 1990s influenced by 
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poststructuralism and postmodernism. The purpose of queer is to destabilize binaries such as 
women-men or gay-straight and resist all kinds of categories in general. (Jackson & Scott 1996, 15-
16, Hall 2003, 4, 15). In this sense, assessing the gender of the patient would not be queer. 
However, the verb queer means to deconstruct stereotypical readings and to find queer potential in a 
text where it has not been sought out before. This is closely related to the idea of resisting reading, a 
term coined by Judith Fetterley in 1978. However, as resistant reading is often connected to the idea 
of reading a text in a way it was not supposed to be read, I argue that the term queer reading fits this 
thesis better, as the reader cannot know how the text was originally meant to be read. Although the 
play can be read from a queer perspective, it is possible that the confusion and frustration that arises 
from the bodily states of the patient could also be seen as part of her mental illness. However, as the 
play itself is so ambiguous, the choice of interpretation is left to the reader. Still, it is important to 
point out the possibility of this reading, as it is indeed a viable one and not without basis, as I will 
prove in the following analysis. 
 Acknowledging different minorities, in this case gender minorities, as interpretive 
possibilities is of great importance as it also allows the reader to gain different kinds of insights to 
the texts analyzed which would not otherwise be possible. I will now examine whether the character 
of the patient could indeed be read as a transwoman. In the first page of the play, there is one line in 
particular in which the issue of gender minorities is spoken out loud and drawn to the surface: “the 
broken hermaphrodite who trusted hermself alone finds the room in reality teeming and begs never 
to wake from the nightmare” (2000, 205). Although “hermaphrodite” is no longer correct 
terminology and intersex is used instead, the term certainly guides the reader into thinking about the 
gender issues that may arise in the play, especially when this occurs on the very first page. As most 
of the discourse of the patient concentrates on herself, it is likely to assume the line is about her. It 
should be noted that since many important factors in the play, such as the BDI answers from which 
the patient’s diagnosis can be analyzed occur on the very first pages, and therefore the patient 
referring to herself as “hermself” should be included in these clues that seem to define many aspects 
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that are relevant in the play. 
 Later on while listing things that the patient feels are wrong with her life she states “I dislike 
my genitals,” which could be either a clue towards reading her as a transgender person, but then 
again one could read it as just one thing in the list of other things she dislikes in her body, such as “I 
am fat” and “my hips are too big” (2000, 207). These kind of lists could just as well be evidence of 
body dysmorphic disorder (a preoccupation or worry that some parts of one's body are defective), 
much depending on the reading one would prefer. However, the patient does state: “I will drown in 
dysphoria / in the black cold pond of myself / the pit of my immaterial mind” (2000, 213), guiding 
the reader towards the reading that she belongs to a gender minority. Although one might argue that 
body dysmorphic disorder could be a part of the experience of being in a gender minority, this state 
is actually called gender dysphoria or gender identity disorder and is a different matter altogether. 
Gender dysphoria is created by the anxiety a person feels between their biological sex and social 
gender, whereas body dysmorphic disorder is a psychiatric disorder (Veale & Neziroglu 2010, xi). 
So, the fact that the word dysphoria is specifically mentioned could serve as further proof of the 
patient’s gender. 
 In the play the patient consistently outlines the dissatisfaction towards her body. The line “I 
need to become who I already am” can also be read as supporting the transgender perspective of the 
character, as one could see the gender the patient identifies as their own as the one they need to 
“become,” in this case most likely physically (2000, 2012). The patient further discusses her 
feelings about her body, stating: “I have reached the end of this dreary and repugnant tale of a sense 
interned in an alien carcass and lumpen by the malignant spirit of the moral majority” (2000, 214). 
Here, the phrase “alien carcass” could be read as supporting the patient’s transgender identity. If 
one would read the patient as a transwoman, alien carcass could easily be explained as a body the 
patient does not identify with. The patient also asks her doctor: “Do you think it’s possible for a 
person to be born in the wrong body?” (2000, 215), which can be read as a confession of the patient 
that she would indeed be transgender and wanting to bring the matter into focus in her therapy. The 
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phrase “being born in wrong body” is one of the most common ways to explain trans experiences, 
and therefore the question can be seen as holding specific importance. 
At one point the patient discusses a “her” that the patient states she has “never touched” and 
that the patient and her will “never meet” (2000, 218). Although this her might be read as a possible 
lover (and through this the character could be read as non-heterosexual), it could also be analyzed in 
relation to the narrative of her gender identity. In chapter 5.3 I discussed the patient stating “it is 
myself I have never met” (2000, 245), which allows the reader to interpret that the “her” the patient 
is talking about would be the patient herself. Especially the line “I miss a woman who was never 
born” (2000, 219) can easily be added to the reading of being born into the “wrong body” the 
patient refers to earlier on. 
 I think reading and analyzing 4.48 Psychosis from a queer perspective is of vital importance, 
especially since it allows a whole new reading to explain why the character of the patient does not 
benefit from her psychotherapy. I argue this is because she is being treated for the wrong reason: the 
symptom and not the cause of her mental health issues. If one is to adopt the reading I have 
presented in this chapter, arguing that the character of the patient would be part of a gender minority 
(a transwoman, to be particular), it could prove that the original cause of her depression would be 
gender dysphoria and possibly minority stress (stress caused by belonging to a minority), and that 
depression would be a symptom of these. Therefore, by treating only her depression and not her 
gender dysphoria the treatment given to her did not get to the root of her illness. As the treatment 
did not issue the original cause of the illness, it did not prove successful. 
 Sarah Kane’s plays have been analyzed from queer perspectives before, however, the studies 
have mostly focused on Cleansed, which explores both the themes of gender and sexuality from 
minority perspectives (e.g. Rayner 2009). Tycer discusses 4.48 Psychosis and the gender of the 
patient in her research, but her base of analysis is Freud’s notion of melancholia and she does not 
discuss the possibility of reading the patient as belonging to a gender minority (2008, 35). The 
queer themes have not been as popular as other themes when analyzing Kane, and therefore there is 
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only a handful of academic texts discussing the queer aspects of her plays which is slightly 
surprising. In fact, as pointed out in this chapter, one could read non-heterosexual elements in 4.48 
Psychosis, but neither this nor the possibilities of reading the patient as belonging to a gender 
minority have not been discussed in academic contexts. As the play obviously allows queer 
readings, this would prove an interesting point for further studies on the play. 
 
5.4 “Last in a Long Line of Literary Kleptomaniacs”: Intertextuality as Fragmentation 
 
Lastly, on the subject of fragmentation, I would like to discuss the highly intertextual nature of the 
play and examine how this intertextuality could be linked to the overall fragmentation of the play 
and especially to the fragmentation of the mind of the patient. Intertextuality is a term coined by 
Julia Kristeva in 1967, and she has defined it as a “mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption 
and transformation of another” (Kristeva 1986, 37). There are several intertextual references in 4.48 
Psychosis, ranging from pop culture to the Bible. Many critics have described 4.48 Psychosis as a 
“textual collage,” and Ken Urban agrees that the play “has a citational quality to the language, as if 
it were culled from disparate sources” (2001, 44).  
I claim that the intertextual references in the play can be read as proof of the fragmentary 
nature of the patient's psyche or mind. In chapter 5.2 I discussed how the patient feels the need to be 
in touch with her essential self, and when she does not feel the connection, she considers these the 
moments of insanity. Intertextual references, especially in the volume they are presented in 4.48 
Psychosis, might serve as proof of the patient not being in connection with her inner self, as these 
references are essentially loans of what other people have said, written, or put into action. All of the 
allusions in the play are presented in the discourses of the patient, making a distinction between the 
presumably healthy mind of the character of the doctor who can form their own sentences and the 
character of the patient who has to rely on words already uttered by someone else. When analyzed 
in this manner, the intertextual references can serve as proof of the patient's mental state, as people 
with severe depression have lowered cognitive skills and therefore producing statements of their 
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own can be harder than usual. One might argue that these type of allusions would be equally 
demanding as finding words of your own, but I would argue that finding the right words might be 
easier when they are already spoken or written by another. For example, it is easy to relate to a 
poem written by someone else and feel that it describes exactly what one is feeling inside, but it 
could prove agonisingly hard to try to put those feelings into words. 
The literary loans provide a deeper understanding of the state of the patient than what she 
could have managed to form herself. They also show how she identifies with or draws inspiration 
from several different texts of different natures, and all of these texts reveal something new about 
her character. This is especially interesting because there is so little to know about the character 
besides her struggles with her mental illness, and therefore intertextual references allow the reader 
to get a better overall view of the patient. For example, loans of canonical literature or religious 
nature would point to the fact that the patient has read at least some classic works of literature and is 
familiar with the Bible at least to some extent, and these could be seen as evidence of education or 
perhaps religiousness. 
 As there are so many intertextual references in the play, a brief explanation on the ideas of 
originality and intertextuality might prove useful. Kerstin Schmidt states that the idea of originality 
blossomed during Romanticism, but before that intertextuality, or “imitative repetition,” was highly 
appreciated in classical art theories (2005, 40). Poststructuralist critics and theorists tend to argue 
that all texts are intertextual as they bear traces of every text and discourse ever to have existed. 
Diverting from the poststructuralist views of intertextuality, Schmidt argues that spotting 
intertextual references might be particularly difficult in postmodern plays since noticing these 
references takes knowledge of both canonical and non-canonical literature and art, and because the 
changes made in the processes of adaptation makes them harder to notice (2005, 36). In this thesis 
my examination of intertextual elements shifts more to Kristeva’s and Schmidt’s definitions of 
intertextuality as quotations than to the poststructuralist view.  
Examining the intertextual references in the play is particularly important because the whole 
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identity of the text can be seen as fragmentary through these loans. If one's original text would be 
regarded as uniform, a text that loans directly from other texts could thus be regarded as fragmented 
by nature. In 4.48 Psychosis the text itself mentions intertextuality, which would lead the reader to 
understand the references within the play as noteworthy. Intertextuality is mentioned quite early on 
in the play in a clear manner: “Last in a long line of literary kleptomaniacs / (a time honoured 
tradition) / Theft is the holy act / On a twisted path to expression” (2000, 213). These lines clearly 
show how intertextual references are used in order to better express oneself. In this chapter, I shall 
examine this twisted path to expression, and analyze how the intertextual references add to the 
sense of fragmentation, both of the play as a whole and particularly the mind of the patient. My 
analysis will move from abstract to more definitive, as I will first focus on the intertextuality of 
themes, and continue to loans that are (almost) identical in form. 
 One of the recurring themes – and a part of the title of the play – is the time 4.48. Although 
the time is never specified to be am and not pm, its immediate context such as the lines “I am 
jealous of my sleeping lover and covet his induced consciousness / when he wakes he will envy my 
sleepless night of thought and speech unslurred by medication” allows an understanding of this time 
being during the night, when others are asleep (2000, 208, italics mine). Though the title 4.48 
Psychosis could lead the leader to consider this time of night as the time of psychosis or other 
mental turmoil, the issue is not as straightforward. Although there are lines such as “at 4.48 / when 
desperation visits / I shall hang myself / to the sound of my lover's breathing” followed by talk 
about suicide, which would suggest the situation of the patient to be worst at 4.48 am, there are also 
the lines “at 4.48 / when sanity visits / for one hour and twelve minutes I am in my right mind” and 
“at 4.48 / the happy hour / when clarity visits,” which would argue just the opposite (2000, 207, 
229, 242). There are also a more neutral alternatives to these two opposites, which are “after 4.48 I 
shall not speak again” and “at 4.48 / I shall sleep” (2000, 213, 233). The time of the night (or very 
early morning) as the point of either sanity or madness can be seen as reference to several different 
canonical literary works: mainly The Silver Chair by C.S. Lewis, “The Hollow Men” by T.S. Eliot, 
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and “Aubade” by Philip Larkin. 
 The idea of the patient having either moments of clarity or desperation in the middle of the 
night can be seen as quite a clear reference to the book The Silver Chair (1953) by C.S Lewis. In 
The Silver Chair the Prince Rillian is cursed, and during the night he suffers from fits of anger and 
rage and he has to be tied to a silver chair. In reality, the curse allows him to remember and to 
regain his sanity, which causes the violent fits as he realizes the situation he is in. The story of 
Prince Rillian resembles that of the patient in 4.48 Psychosis quite accurately, as the patient asks: 
“Now I am here I can see myself / but when I am charmed by vile delusions of happiness, / the foul 
magic of this engine of sorcery, / I cannot touch my essential self / Why do you believe me then and 
not now?” (2000, 229).  
As Prince Rillian is deemed mad at his hour of sanity, the patient suffers from the same. 
Watson argues that at 4.48 “lucidity and psychosis are both at their strongest” (2008, 197), and the 
extracts cited on the previous page seem to confirm this notion. However, although these extracts do 
not always give a very lucid image of the patient, they seem saner than some other parts of the play 
(compare with e.g. 2000, 225-226, 231-232, 242-244). I think it is problematic to regard some of 
the extracts as proof of psychosis being at its strongest since the play is filled with examples of 
severe fragmentation that could rather be read as points of psychosis. Surely, the lines after 4.48 am 
are uttered from the first person perspective, which allows the reader to connect the statements that 
follow to the patient, whereas some of the lists of words (my examples of psychosis above) can 
seem random in nature and therefore perhaps harder to connect to the patient. 
 Acknowledging the intertextual reference to The Silver Chair allows the reader to access 
some of the feelings of the patient. The patient, like the prince, feel as if they are “charmed” or that 
there is “magic” involved in their predicaments. While the prince is actually charmed and thus 
cannot escape his situation without the help of others, the “curse” that binds the patient is her illness 
which she by herself cannot get cured from. In the case of the patient the ones to help her break the 
curse are the doctors, and when one understands this reference it becomes more understandable why 
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the patient seems so dependent on her current doctor, who she claims to be her “last hope” (2000, 
236). Indeed, sometimes mental diseases can occur unexpectedly and without any reason to 
seemingly random people. It does not always take a traumatic past or present to fall under mental 
illness, and thus it could poetically speaking be seen as a “curse”. Surely, curses almost always have 
someone to cast them, so the metaphor is not perfect in that sense. However, it is undeniable that 
4.48 Psychosis has many similarities to the story of The Silver Chair. 
 Still on the theme of the time 4.48 am, 4.48 Psychosis bears resemblance to the poems “The 
Hollow Men” (1952) by T.S. Eliot and “Audabe” (1990) by Philip Larkin. “The Hollow Men” tells 
the story of men who are hollow but stuffed and left to themselves in what is most likely a desert. 
As to interpretations to who these hollow men are, an intertextual reference to Dante Alighieri's 
Inferno and Paradiso seem to be the most prominent ones, allowing an understanding of the hollow 
men as people who cannot move on either to Heaven or Hell although they have already died. In 
“The Hollow Men” the lines “here we go round the prickly pear / prickly pear prickly pear / here we 
go around the prickly pear / at five o'clock in the morning” (1952, 58) brings the reader to the same 
time frame familiar to that of 4.48 Psychosis, although Eliot's time is not as exact as Kane's. From 
this time frame of “five o'clock in the morning” one can start to look at the mind-set of the hollow 
men, and begin to see resemblance to that of the patient in 4.48 Psychosis. 
 From the very first lines, “headpiece filled with straw” (1952, 56), one can start draw 
parallels to the patient in Kane's play. As the hollow men's headpieces are filled with straw, the head 
of the patient is filled with drugs. Both the hollow men and the patient are filled with something, yet 
they remain “hollow,” empty. As this emptiness cannot be taken for its literal meaning, it must be 
taken to count for the emptiness of the soul or the mind. The lines “our dried voices, when / we 
whisper together / are quiet and meaningless” (1952, 58), bring to mind the certain passivity mental 
patients have of their treatment and the social stigmas that are still related to mental disorders. The 
following lines could almost be straight out of 4.48 Psychosis, as they seem very similar in both 
form and content: “Shape without form, shade without colour, / Paralysed force, gesture without 
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motion” (1952, 56). The same problematic nature of form is present in both the play and in the 
poem, as is the sense of not quite being able to accomplish something. I would argue that just these 
lines could even be used to describe 4.48 Psychosis quite comprehensively without losing much of 
the essential content of the play. In fact, there are lines in 4.48 Psychosis that are quite close to the 
second lines of the citation from “The Hollow Men”: “drowning in a sea of logic / this monstrous 
state of palsy” (2000, 233). The final lines in the last stanza, “this is the way the world ends / not 
with a bang but a whimper” (1952, 59), could be taken in a suicidal sense. Though suicide could 
surely be regarded as the proverbial “bang,” it is still most likely that in the case of suicide one's life 
would actually end in a whimper, some last involuntary sound as the body ceases to function. 
 If the time frame of “The Hollow Men” was not as exact as that of 4.48 Psychosis's, Philip 
Larkin's “Aubade” (1990) continues on the same lines. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the 
word aubade itself as “a musical announcement of dawn, a sunrise song or an open-air concert” 
(OED Online). However, the line “waking at four to soundless dark, I stare” gives a more precise 
time frame to the poem (1990, 208). “Aubade” relates to 4.48 Psychosis not only through the 
similar time frame, but also through its theme: death, and a certain kind of defeat. The poetic 
speaker states: 
Waking at four to soundless dark, I stare. 
In time the curtain-edges will grow light. 
Till then I see what's really always there: 
Unresting death, a whole day nearer now, 
Making all thought impossible but how 
And where and when I shall myself die. (1990, 208) 
 
Although “Aubade” is not about suicide like most mentions of death in 4.48 Psychosis are, it is 
clear that death is one of the main themes in both works. Death is also evident in “The Hollow 
Men,” and so the theme binds all the three texts together. Whereas in the “The Hollow Men” the 
death has already come, in “Aubade” the tragedy of life is the fact that eventually everyone will die 
and the knowledge of this “slows each impulse down to indecision” (1990, 209). In “Aubade” there 
is no escape from either death or the wait for it to come, yet the thought of one's eventual decease 
cannot be accepted. In 4.48 Psychosis death has not yet arrived to the patient, but she actively 
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discusses (“I have been dead for a long time,” “I'll die / not yet / but it's there,” 2000, 214, 226) and 
plans it (“I have resigned myself to death this year,” “take an overdose, slash my wrists then hang 
myself,“ 2000, 208, 210). However, it must be noted that the patient does not look forward to taking 
her own life, as she states: “I have no desire for death / no suicide ever had” (2000, 244). As the 
final lines of “Aubade” bring forth a decided sense of defeat and the triviality of the mundane 
experience (“Meanwhile telephones crouch, getting ready to ring / In locked up offices, and all the 
uncaring / Intricate rented world begins to rouse […] Work has to be done,” 1990, 209), so does the 
following line in 4.48 Psychosis: “the morning brings defeat” (2000, 231). Both poems regard the 
early hours of the morning as a time of reflection and, to some extent, depression and/or lucidness, 
and the morning brings a sort of cold comfort of the world moving on despite what has been 
thought of in the darkness of the night. 
 From canonical literature and the intertextuality of themes, I will continue examining the 
religious references in 4.48 Psychosis, namely ones from the Bible and especially The Old 
Testament. There are several intertextual references to the Bible, some of which are identical and 
some slightly altered. As there so many Biblical references, I will only analyze the most significant 
and perhaps easily recognizable ones, as analyzing all of them could be a thesis on its own. Most of 
the references come from the Old Testament, from which there are loans from the books of 
Leviticus, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Chronicles, Psalms, and Zechariah, and from the New Testament there 
are loans from the books of Matthew, Luke, John, and Revelation.  
The most recognizable Biblical reference is the patient saying “my love, my love, why have 
you forsaken me?” (2000, 219), which can easily be recognized as a version of Jesus's cry “My 
God, my God, why have you forsaken me” (King James Bible, The New Testament, Matt. 27:46) 
while he is dying from his crucifixion on the cross. These lines can be interpreted in a similar 
manner from both sources: in both cases there is someone the speaker looks up to, and now they 
feel abandoned by them. In the case of the patient, my god or my love could be seen as referring to 
the character of the doctor who the patient confesses loving in the play and whom she in fact calls 
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“my god” (2000, 233). To understand the love or god as referring to the character of the doctor 
emphasizes the unequal nature of their relationship. Another significant sentence that is repeated 
many times throughout the play, “Remember the light and believe the light” (2000, 206, 228, 229), 
is a reference from the Book of John in the New Testament: “while ye have light, believe in the 
light” (12:36). The notion of light comes forth several times through different lines in the play, and I 
argue that “light” could be seen as a reference to the moments of sanity the character of the patients 
has from time to time. Reading “light” as equal to “sanity” connects the Biblical loan to the 
references of The Silver Chair analyzed before in this chapter, further emphasizing the distinction 
between the moments of sanity and lucidity and the moments of insanity or psychosis. 
Besides the citations from Matthew and John analyzed above, all the other biblical 
references can be found in the same scene. This is particularly interesting, because there are 
altogether 17 references in the space of only two pages. This makes the scene in which they appear 
distinctly different in style from the rest of the text. From The Old Testament and the Book of Isaiah 
there are several references, the most notable one being perhaps the following “And they shall look 
unto earth / and behold trouble and darkness / dimness of anguish / and they shall be driven to 
darkness” (8:22). The first reference can clearly be seen as inspiring the following lines in the play 
“behold the light and despair / the glare of anguish / and ye shall be driven to darkness” (2000, 
228). The change of trouble and darkness to light and despair is a clear revision to the themes of 
4.48 Psychosis, but one may only wonder what is meant by darkness here. Is it a reference to death, 
depression, or perhaps being a pariah in society? Certainly, all of these three can easily be seen in 
reference to mental illness. Again, the selection of Biblical loans could be seen as emphasizing the 
distinction between sanity and insanity.  There are also a few other loans from Isaiah: “the mountain 
of the Lord’s house”/”Sanity is found in the mountain of the Lord’s house” (2:2, 2000, 229), “why 
should ye be stricken anymore, ye will revolt more and more, the whole head is sick and the whole 
heart faint”/”why am I stricken”, “the head is sick and the heart’s caul torn” (1:5, 2000, 228, 229), 
“gird yourselves, for ye shall be broken in pieces” (8:9, 2000, 228), and “come now, let us reason 
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together” (1:18, 2000, 229).  
Another loans from the Bible include such as: “I saw visions of God” (Ezek. 1:1, 2000, 
228), “if there be blasting” (Chron. 6:28, 2000, 228), “that preach ye upon rooftops”/”shall be 
proclaimed upon the housetops”/”shouted from the rooftops” (Matt. 10:27, Luke 12:3, 2000, 
228),“fear God” (Rev. 14: 7, 2000, 228), “if the scall be not spread on skin”/”a scall on my skin” 
(Lev. 13:13 [the exact form of the verse changes between different versions of Bibles), 2000, 228), 
“and it shall come to pass” (Zech. 14:16, 2000, 228), “the abjects gathered themselves around 
me”/“we are the abjects” (Ps. 35:15, 2000, 229) and “and burn incense unto Baal” (Jer. 7:9, 2000, 
229). There are more loans from the Bible alone than of any other text, and because of this it could 
be argued that the Bible could be seen as holding specific significance to the character of the 
patient. As the references are so plentiful and they show a working knowledge of the Bible, one 
could argue that the character of the patient could either be religious herself, or perhaps been raised 
in a very religious family or got her education at a religious school. Altogether the Biblical 
references form an atmosphere most critics agree to be apocalyptic, with notions of visions, 
darkness, light and despair. The fact that most of the references are found in a single scene could be 
significant, for example, one might wonder if the patient is trying to find consolation from religion 
in a certain point during her illness. 
 Lastly, there are a few intertextual references to popular culture which need to be examined. 
Recognizing these references is especially important in a postmodern framework that emphasizes 
the popular. From popular music, 4.48 Psychosis contains the line “still ill” (2000, 223) known from 
a song by The Smiths that goes by the same name. “Still ill” (1984) contains a lot of the same 
themes as 4.48 Psychosis, such as depression or illness (“for there are brighter sides to life / and I 
should know because I've seen them / but not very often”), death (“ask me why and I'll die / oh ask 
me why and I'll die”), and the division between the mind and the body (“does the body rule the 
mind / or does the mind rule the body / I dunno”). Again, the references bring forth themes crucial 
to the play, namely the divisions between the body and the mind and between sanity and depression. 
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The other popular culture reference is “the chicken's still dancing / the chicken won't stop” 
(2000, 243) that points to the movie Stroszek, directed by Werner Herzog. In Stroszek (1977) there 
is a little booth in which a chicken is “dancing” (the booth is named “The Dancing Chicken”) for a 
relatively long time. It seems the chicken itself is pulling a little string again and again so the music 
would not stop. This could perhaps be seen as an allusion to life, in which one would pull one string 
after another in order for life not to end and death not to come. It is also known that Stroszek was 
the last film watched by Ian Curtis, the frontman of the post-punk band Joy Division, before 
committing suicide, linking the film to the theme of suicide in the play. 
As discussed in this chapter, it seems that the character of the patient uses intertextual 
elements, either in the form of thematic references or quotations, to express herself. The intertextual 
elements bring forth themes that seem to be essential to the play, such as the states of sanity and 
insanity and the disconnection between the body and the mind. Certainly, from what has been 
analyzed both in this chapter and the previous ones, the themes mentioned above seem to form the 
crucial issues that bring all of the patient’s discourse together. Both of these themes emphasize 
fragmentation and a sense of division in the patient, making it possible to argue that the text does 
represent the fragmentation of the patient’s mind in both textual and visual form and in its content. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have explored the themes of medicalization, anti-psychiatry, psychotherapy, 
fragmentariness of the self and the textual form and content, and the failure of psychiatric practices 
in 4.48 Psychosis. I have analyzed the play on the basis of theories both on medicalization and anti-
psychiatry, psychotherapy, and on postmodern theories on the nature of texts, mostly of form and 
unity. Uniting different types of theoretical resources has allowed me to better examine and analyze 
the play which in itself is endlessly complex, ambiguous and challenging to the reader. My initial 
research question of how the mind-set or psyche of the character of the patient is affected by her 
mental illness and the psychiatric and psychotherapeutic treatment she goes through in the play 
remained strong through my research process, although the more I analyzed 4.48 Psychosis, the 
more plausible ways of reading the play seemed to emerge.  
 I would argue that the most significant finding of this thesis is presenting the possibility of 
reading the character of the patient as belonging to a gender minority, because this opens a whole 
new way of analyzing the play, both its textual content and the eventual fail of psychiatry in the 
case of treating the patient, as discussed in chapter 5.3. This kind of queer reading of the character 
of the patient has not been presented before in an academic context, although Kane’s plays have 
previously been examined from queer perspectives (especially Cleansed). I claim that reading the 
character of the patient as a transwoman provides the reader with more ways to interpret the play 
than the typical, genderless reading that is mostly applied to it. Besides the obvious benefit that 
comes from new interpretational possibilities, it is particularly important to note the queer aspects 
(gender minorities, non-heterosexual characters) of a text whenever possible. As there are so few 
characters in literature that are not cisgender, pointing out the possibility of a queer reading like the 
one in 4.48 Psychosis adds the text to the list of LGBTQIA4 literature. As this list of literature is not 
                                                          
4 The acronym LGBTQIA is used when referring to sexual and gender minorities. The letters come from the words 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans* (trans with an asterisk is used as an umbrella term for sexual minorities), transgender or 
transsexual, queer or questioning, intersex and asexual or ally. There is some variation as to what the letters are seen as 
referring to, and to avoid confusion I have gathered here all of the most typical ways to interpret the letters. However, it 
is good to note that the acronym is not as self-explanatory as it seems, for example, one might wonder why some people 
interpret the letter a for allies, as they do not belong to the minority groups the acronym is used to refer to. 
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profusely long, it is important to address queer themes when they are unquestionably present or 
plausible ways of reading, as literature and literary characters are easily relatable with, and therefore 
can help people belonging to sexual or gender minorities cope with their experiences, for example, 
minority stress or discrimination. Since gender is essentially an important social category, the 
understanding of the patient’s gender adds important knowledge to her character, as the aspect of 
the patient’s gender has been ignored or dealt with a sentence or two in most academic texts 
considering 4.48 Psychosis. 
 My main object of analysis has been the character of the patient and how the psychiatric 
interventions, such as psychotherapy and psychotropic treatment, affect her sense of self. From the 
analysis provided in chapter 4.2.1 it can be noted that the psychiatric tests used to scan her mental 
states have an essential role in the play, and the patient’s own statements often blend to these tests. 
Besides the influence the tests have on the patient and her self-evaluation of her mental state, the 
patient is highly affected by the psychotropic drugs that are prescribed to her. Almost all of the 
eight drugs that she tries have negative side effects on her, and as the ninth drug is offered, she 
refuses treatment and tries to kill herself. As mentioned in chapter 4.2.2, the prescription medicine 
is one of the clearest examples of how medical authority is portrayed as being dubious in the play. 
The chapters 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 provide essential information on how the medicalization of mental 
illnesses has affected the life of the patient, as both the psychiatric tests and the medicine she has 
been prescribed are forms of treatment resulting from the process of medicalization of the 
depression which she suffers from. 
Besides examining the character of the patient, I have analyzed the character of the doctor, 
whom I found to be quite unprofessional, misleading and even harmful to the treatment and 
recovery of the patient. Although the success of therapy lies much on the patient themselves 
(statistics from Asay and Lambert, presented in chapter 3.1 and further discussed in chapters 4.1 
and 4.1.2), I would argue that the character of the doctor was an essential part as to why the therapy 
did not work for the patient, besides the argument presented in chapter 5.3 that offers gender 
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dysphoria as the cause of her depression. As analyzed in chapter 4.1.1, the doctor behaved 
unprofessionally, mislead the patient emotionally, and did not understand the difference between 
the theories of psychiatry, psychology and psychotherapy and their patient, therefore not truly 
understanding her but rather trying to conform her to the theories they knew. Here we are faced 
with Masson’s ideas that therapists are harmful to the process of therapy because they are not able 
to make the distinction between theory and reality, and because they are after all only human, each 
carrying their personal prejudice and faults (Masson’s critique presented in chapter 3.2). 
Altogether, it seems that the character of the patient did not benefit from her medical 
treatment at all, as she seems to be in anguish throughout the entire play. Psychotherapy did not 
help her, and neither did drugs. Though have I argued that in the therapy witnessed in 4.48 
Psychosis the doctor is the main reason for its failure, the reader does not have the possibility to 
review the therapy she did with her previous doctors, and because of this the reader might be left 
wondering if the character of the patient is one of those unlucky ones that simply cannot benefit 
from psychotherapy. However, it is evident that the character of the doctor did nothing to aid the 
process of therapy on their part, which is why they could be considered one of the reasons of its 
failure.  
As some of treatment the patient receives in the play, mainly the psychiatric tests discussed 
in chapter 4.21, are not analyzed in the play itself, this leaves the process of analyzing the results 
and diagnosing the patient for the audience or the reader. This results in a possibly uncomfortable, 
in-yer-face-style position to the ones who are left to analyze these results, as here the medical power 
is transferred from the character of the doctor to the audience or the reader. As the medical power is 
transferred, so is the responsibility that comes with it, resulting in a unique position in which the 
failures of medicine can be felt by the audience or the reader both from the perspective of the 
patient and the perspective of the medical professional.  
 On the subject of fragmentation, 4.48 Psychosis has a lot to offer. In this thesis I have 
examined fragmentation from three different angles: the fragmentation of the text and its 
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implications on the play, the fragmentation of the mind, the mind/body divide the patient suffers 
from, and the fragmentation of a text as a whole through the idea of intertextuality. Generally, 4.48 
Psychosis is certainly one of the most fragmented plays to exist. The fragmentation in the play is 
essentially a postmodern feature, fragmentation without origin, which makes interpretations of the 
play a rather personal matter, as each person will try to interpret the play as their minds best seem 
fit. Still, it can be stated with certainty that the fragmentation in 4.48 Psychosis is deeply related to 
the mind of the patient and the fragmentation she feels about herself. Content-wise, the text is full 
of contradictions and division between the body and the mind and sanity and insanity, and this is 
clearly reflected in the form of the play. As the source of the discourse, which is mostly the 
character of the patient, is so profoundly fragmented it can be but expected that the text be highly 
fragmented as well. 
 As noted before in this conclusion, 4.48 Psychosis seemed to open up a reading after another 
when I started the process of analyzing the play. I think the play has many interesting possibilities 
for further studies, and I am particularly keen to recommend the possibilities of analysis on the 
LGBTQIA themes. Although this thesis provides a possible starting point for queer readings on the 
gender identity of the patient, this could be analyzed further. For example, one might want to apply 
theories on gender dysphoria or minority stress to the play and see what this could bring to the 
analysis. The play could also be examined for non-heterosexual desires, something which I 
mentioned previously in chapter 5.3. However, in general 4.48 Psychosis has not been widely 
studied, so it would provide an excellent basis for almost any type of analysis one could see fitting 
to the nature of the play.  
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